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IN CRIMINAL APPEALS: THE IOWA EXPERIENCE 
Tyler J. Buller* 
I. INTRODUCTION
In Iowa’s criminal justice system, indigent defendants are 
represented by two separate and distinct groups: public 
defenders, who are salaried government employees, and court-
appointed attorneys, who contract with the state on an hourly 
basis. This is an article about their performance on appeal. 
Iowa’s appellate courts decide roughly five hundred 
criminal appeals every year.1 Most appeals, criminal and 
otherwise, are decided by the Court of Appeals, Iowa’s 
*Assistant Attorney General, Iowa Department of Justice. J.D., University of Iowa College 
of Law; B.A., Drake University. In the interest of full disclosure, the author was a clinical 
extern in the Iowa Appellate Defender’s Office during law school. The views expressed in 
this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the State of Iowa, the Iowa Department of 
Justice, or the Attorney General of Iowa. Special thanks to Assistant Attorneys General 
Darrel Mullins, Linda Hines, Heather Quick, and Nathan Blake, as well as John Lande, for 
thoughtful comments provided during the revision of this piece. The author can be reached 
at tyler.buller@gmail.com. 
 1. As revealed in the study at the heart of this piece, the Iowa Court of Appeals 
decided 987 criminal appeals between 2012 and 2013, and the Iowa Supreme Court 
retained twenty-one criminal appeals during the same period. This works out to 1,008 cases 
over two years, or 504 cases per year. 
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intermediate appellate court.2 In each criminal appeal, defense 
attorneys face off against assistant attorneys general from the 
state Department of Justice’s criminal appeals division. One 
might wonder whether the type of criminal defense attorney—
appellate defender, court-appointed attorney, or retained 
counsel—makes a difference. Until now, there has been almost 
no data to answer that question. 
Only one existing study, focusing on New York appeals in 
the late 1980s, has meaningfully explored appellate outcomes 
based on type of counsel.3 Two subsequent, more-limited studies 
found results inconsistent with the New York data.4 Data about 
trial-level counsel are similarly a mixed bag, with some studies 
showing public defenders are more effective than court-
appointed attorneys, some showing the opposite, and some 
showing that there are no significant differences.5
The original study contained in this article aims to break 
past the noise and provide a clear answer—at least for Iowans—
as to whether the type of counsel matters in a criminal appeal. 
The study reports on objective measures of counsel’s 
effectiveness: the number of cases in which defendants obtain 
favorable outcomes, the number of filings with procedural and 
technical problems, the rate at which counsel sought further 
review by the Iowa Supreme Court, and the rate at which further 
review was granted. 
The data show that the appellate defenders generally 
perform better than court-appointed lawyers—they win more 
 2. See generally 2012–2013 Iowa Appellate Courts Statistical Report (noting that the 
Court of Appeals disposed of approximately 3,000 appellate cases in the 2012–13 year, 
while the Iowa Supreme Court disposed of 213 cases) (on file with author). The numbers 
contained in the statistical report do not include cases disposed of by motion practice (e.g., 
a State’s motion to dismiss an appeal or summarily reverse a conviction or sentence). See
IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1006 (2015) (covering dispositional-motion practice), available at https: 
//www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/10-29-2015.6.pdf. 
 3. DAVID T. WASSERMAN, A SWORD FOR THE CONVICTED: REPRESENTING INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS ON APPEAL (1990).
 4. Jimmy J. Williams, Type of Counsel and the Outcome of Criminal Appeals: A 
Research Note, 19 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 275, 275 (1995) (noting that “type of counsel was 
nonsignificant in predicting the court’s decision”); JOY A. CHAPPER & ROGER A. HANSON,
UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR 27–28 (1989) (noting that “winning does not appear 
to be strongly associated with . . . the type of lawyer”) [hereinafter REVERSIBLE ERROR].
These studies are discussed in more detail in Part III. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
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cases, have fewer procedural and technical problems, seek 
further review in more cases, and obtain further review more 
often.6 One particularly striking difference is that, over the 
course of two years, court-appointed appellate lawyers never 
had a further-review application granted; the appellate defenders 
convinced the Supreme Court to take eighteen unfavorable 
Court of Appeals decisions on further review. Looking in 
another direction, the data also show that representation 
provided by the appellate defenders was roughly comparable to 
that provided by privately retained defense counsel: Minor 
differences appear between the groups, but neither the appellate 
defenders nor retained counsel come out clearly ahead on the 
objective measures—except for the appellate defenders’ 
dramatically lower number of procedurally and technically 
defective filings. 
There is no quick fix that can upgrade court-appointed 
attorneys’ performance. But the final section of this piece 
suggests a few places to start. Court-appointed attorneys need 
better training and better support. Existing prerequisites and 
continuing-legal-education requirements for court-appointed 
attorneys are not enough. Iowa should explore expanding the 
number of appellate defenders to give more defendants more 
consistent representation; or, if the present system of court 
appointments endures, the State Public Defender should 
consider giving the appellate defenders oversight over court-
appointed attorneys’ work product. This article explains why. 
II. CRIMINAL APPEALS IN IOWA
The focus of this paper and study are relatively narrow: 
criminal appeals in the state courts of Iowa. But criminal appeals 
are not unique to Iowa—they are present in every state,7 and at 
least some research suggests that the broad contours of criminal 
 6. See infra Part III(B); Appendix C: Statistical Breakdowns for Outcomes (2012–
2013, All Criminal Appeals). 
 7. Criminal appeals also occur at the federal level, but those federal cases fall outside 
the scope of this article. For a short and accessible introduction to federal criminal appeals, 
see Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93 
MARQUETTE L. REV. 825 (2009). 
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appeals have “[f]ew striking differences” among the states.8
Because the institutional features of Iowa criminal appeals may 
have shaped the results contained in this study, an exploration of 
the distinctive make-up of Iowa’s appellate criminal-justice 
system is the starting point for understanding whether the type 
of counsel makes a difference. 
A. The Courts: The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals 
Unlike nearly all its sister states, Iowa has a deflective 
routing system in which all appeals originate in the Supreme 
Court, and the overwhelming majority are transferred to the 
Court of Appeals for disposition.9 In 2012 and 2013, the 
Supreme Court decided10 twenty-one criminal appeals through 
retention, while the remaining 987 criminal appeals were 
transferred to the Court of Appeals.11 For the overwhelming 
majority of criminal defendants, the Court of Appeals is the state 
court of first and last resort. Only about five percent of criminal 
appeals see action by the Supreme Court: the retained cases 
amount to 2.15 percent of all criminal appeals, and another 2.82 
percent of criminal appeals are granted further review by the 
Supreme Court.12
 8. REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 4, at 4. 
 9. See generally IOWA CODE § 602.1102 (2013) (describing structure of judicial 
branch); § 602.4102 (2013) (describing jurisdiction of the supreme court, authority to 
transfer cases to the court of appeals, and procedure for further review); § 602.5103 (2013) 
(describing court of appeals jurisdiction), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ 
code/2013/602.pdf. While the Supreme Court of Iowa is created by the Iowa Constitution, 
the Court of Appeals is purely a creature of statute. See IOWA CONST. art. V (creating 
supreme  and district courts, authorizing general assembly to create new  inferior courts). 
 10. When I use the word “decided,” I mean cases that are decided by opinion 
(published or unpublished) following formal submission to an appellate court. The figures 
contained in this article do not include cases that are disposed of before formal submission 
based on a dispositional motion, such as a motion to dismiss, affirm, or reverse. 
 11. At later points in this article, I refer to the total number of 2012–2013 criminal 
appeals as 975 (rather than 987). The statistics calculated in this study are based only on 
cases in which counsel appeared on behalf of a criminal defendant; pro se appeals, in 
which no counsel entered an appearance, were excluded. 
 12. In the 2012–2013 sample used in this study (excluding the twelve pro se appeals), 
2.82 percent of all criminal appeals were reviewed by the Supreme Court on further 
review. See Table 8: Further Review Obtained Following Loss, infra p. 245. Out of 521 
applications, just twenty-three were granted further review, for a rate of 4.41 percent. See
id. No pro se applications were granted. 
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The court that hears an appeal matters. Iowa’s Supreme 
Court, at least according to its own rules, retains only a narrow 
band of cases—constitutional challenges to statutes or rules, 
cases concerning a conflict among lower courts, “substantial” 
issues of first impression, “fundamental and urgent issues of 
broad importance,” and cases presenting “substantial” questions 
of enunciating or changing legal principles.13 As compared to 
Iowa’s Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals is an error-
correcting court,14 with mandatory rather than discretionary 
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals must decide all cases 
transferred to it by the Supreme Court and—again, at least 
according to the rules—it ordinarily hears cases involving “the 
application of existing legal principles” and cases “that are 
appropriate for summary disposition.”15
This institutional structure means that the overwhelming 
majority of criminal appeals in Iowa have their first and only 
hearing before the Court of Appeals. And more than ninety 
percent of these cases are decided on the briefs, without oral 
argument.16 For this reason, a study of Iowa’s criminal appeals 
properly focuses on dispositions before the Court of Appeals 
and evaluates features of the briefing process that can be 
discerned from publicly accessible documents. 
B. The Players: 
Varying Defense Counsel against the Attorney General 
The parties in Iowa criminal appeals are predictable: On 
one side is the State of Iowa, and on the other is an individual 
 13. IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1101(2) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ 
ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf. The retention criteria also include lawyer-
discipline appeals, which are not particularly relevant to the discussion of criminal appeals 
in this article. IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1101(2)(e). 
 14. For a broader discussion of appellate courts’ error-correcting function, see 
generally Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995); see also REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 4, at 27 (referring to 
“[t]he primary function of intermediate appellate courts . . . [as] error correction—
examining lower court proceedings to determine the correctness of the law applied and the 
procedures followed”).
 15. IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1101(3) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ 
ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf. 
 16.  In the sample, only ninety out of 975 cases (9.23 percent) involved oral argument. 
See Table 21: Oral Argument, infra p. 249. 
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criminal defendant or inmate.17 Most cases involve repeat 
players (among counsel and sometimes defendants). To 
understand the data contained in this article, necessary 
background includes the identity of recurring players in the 
criminal-appeals arena. 
1. Defense Counsel 
In Iowa, criminal defendants and prisoners have a statutory 
right to counsel in most cases before the appellate courts.18 But 
the statute does not guarantee a particular type of defense 
attorney. Most criminal defendants are indigent and receive 
counsel at public expense.19 Whether a particular defendant is 
entitled to counsel at public expense turns on state 
administrative rules tied to federal poverty guidelines.20
Like in other states,21 not all attorneys that represent Iowa’s 
criminal defendants come from the same background or have the 
same attributes. Indigent defendants are represented by two 
categories of appellate counsel—either what I refer to as 
“appellate defenders” (the government employees dedicated 
 17. An extremely small number of criminal appeals involve briefs filed by amicus 
curiae. Only two cases in this study included an amicus brief. In one, the National Alliance 
of State and Territorial AIDS Directors, The Center For HIV Law and Policy, and the HIV 
Law Project filed a brief concerning Iowa’s statute criminalizing the knowing failure to 
disclose one’s HIV status. Rhoades v. State, 2013 WL 5498141 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) 
vacated and rev’d on further review, 848 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 2014). In the other, the 
Innocence Project of Iowa filed a brief urging changes in the law concerning the 
preservation of evidence. Alexander v. State, 2013 WL 5291938 at *2 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2013).
 18. IOWA CODE § 814.11(1)–(2) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/
code/2013/814.pdf. As is true in the district courts, a criminal defendant is not entitled as a 
matter of right to counsel in the “appeal” (really discretionary review) of a simple-
misdemeanor conviction. 
 19. In 2012 and 2013, 86.32 percent of criminal defendants were appointed counsel at 
public expense. Counsel was privately retained by 12.46 percent of criminal defendants, 
and 1.21 percent of criminal defendants represented themselves pro se. See Table 20: Type 
of Counsel Overall (Pro Se Included), infra p. 249. 
 20. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-10.5 (Dec. 25, 2013) (describing required affidavit of 
financial status and setting out procedure for  calculating need), available at https://www 
.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/12-25-2013.493.pdf. 
 21. For an overview of general approaches to appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants, see Lauren M. Block, Assignment of Counsel for Indigents, in 1 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 126 (Jay S. Albanese ed., 1st. 
ed., 2014) and Robert L. Spangeberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the 
United States, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 31 (1995). 
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full-time to indigent defense) or “court-appointed attorneys” 
(private lawyers who contract with the state to represent indigent 
defendants on a part-time hourly basis). Non-indigent 
defendants are represented by lawyers they pay for, whom I 
refer to in this paper as “retained attorneys.” As discussed 
below, the way these groups become involved in criminal 
appeals differs, as do their respective workloads. I explore these 
differences below because they may, at least in part, explain 
differences between the groups on the metrics measured in the 
original study. 
a. The Appellate Defender’s Office 
The genesis of the Iowa Appellate Defender’s Office was a 
1979 report by the Iowa Supreme Court’s Litigation Committee, 
which recommended creation of a statewide appellate defense 
office.22 Legislation to establish the office was overwhelmingly 
advanced by the Iowa General Assembly and signed by 
Governor Robert Ray in 1981.23 The only clear point of 
contention in the initial legislation was over appointment of the 
State Appellate Defender: The Iowa Senate favored he be hired 
by a governor-appointed commission while the Iowa House 
favored direct appointment by the governor.24 The House 
version prevailed and the office was made permanent by 
legislation in 1982.25 The statutory scheme for the office today 
is similar to that at its origin, though a 1989 amendment 
provided for appointment of the State Appellate Defender by the 
governor-appointed (and state-senate-confirmed) State Public 
Defender, rather than direct appointment of the Appellate 
Defender by the governor.26
As explained in a report provided to Iowa’s governor after 
the office opened: 
 22. NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, FINAL EVALUATION OF THE 
IOWA APPELLATE DEFENDER (1982) at 3, 5 [hereinafter IAD REPORT ]. 
 23. Id. at 3–6; 81 Iowa Acts ch. 23 (69th G.A.).
 24. IAD REPORT, supra note 22, at 6–7. 
 25. Id. at 6. 
 26. 1989 Acts. ch. 51, § 2 (73rd G.A.); see generally IOWA CODE Ch. 13B (2013),
available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/13B.pdf.
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Major objectives of the [Appellate Defender] include 
reducing the cost of criminal appeals within the state, 
providing property tax relief to local counties by absorbing 
costs resulting from indigent criminal appeals, promoting 
greater judicial efficiency within the criminal justice 
system by reducing unnecessary delays in the 
administration of criminal appeals, and promoting the best 
interest of justice by providing high quality appellate 
representation to indigent criminal defendants.27
Today, the Appellate Defender (AD)’s Office largely pursues 
these same objectives, though its focus has narrowed to purely 
state appellate matters—rather than state-district-court litigation 
or federal litigation—in the intervening years.28
In terms of personnel, the AD’s Office employed thirteen 
full-time attorneys in 2012 and fourteen full-time attorneys in 
2013.29 These attorneys, on average, had about twelve years of 
experience in the AD’s office, and the amount of criminal-
appellate experience ranged from two years to forty-one years.30
Each assistant appellate defender is expected to handle between 
thirty-five and forty cases per year.31 Appellate defenders are 
 27. IAD REPORT, supra note 22, at App. F-3 p. 1. 
 28. Compare IAD REPORT, supra note 22, at 6 & 11 (requiring the AD’s Office to 
handle postconviction matters before the district courts) with IOWA CODE § 13B.11 (2013) 
(requiring state appellate defender to “represent indigents on appeal in criminal cases and 
on appeal in proceedings to obtain postconviction relief when appointed to do so by the 
district court”), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/13B.pdf, and
Email from Kurt Swaim, First Assistant State Public Defender, Questions Re: AD for Law 
Review Article (Dec. 12, 2014) (transmitting State Appellate Defender Mark Smith’s 
responses to author’s questions about State Appellate Defender’s policies and practices) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Swaim December Email] (both noting that, today, the 
AD’s office represents criminal defendants only on direct or interlocutory appeals in 
criminal cases, appeals from a denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, appeals 
from probation or parole revocation proceedings, and appeals from the denial of an 
application for postconviction relief). The only time the AD’s office appears in federal 
court would be United States Supreme Court certiorari review of a state-court decision. See 
Attachment to Swaim December Email (on file with author). The chief appellate defender 
reports that his office has only participated in one United States Supreme Court case over 
the last decade. See id.
 29.  Swaim December Email, supra note 28. For both years, the office also had four 
full-time support staff. See id.
 30. Id.
 31. Id.
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salaried, rather than paid hourly, and the pay scale ranged from 
$48,505 to $111,820 as of June, 2013.32
Under the Iowa Code, the Appellate Defender is appointed 
to all criminal appeals originating in the district court, and then 
has the opportunity to withdraw.33 Decisions about when to 
withdraw are not purely random. According to the chief 
appellate defender,34 during the period explored in this study the 
office’s practice was to “take all cases [it] can reasonably 
handle,” other than conflicts.35 The chief appellate defender 
reports that, when the office has to withdraw for workload 
reasons, the office will “generally withdraw from the less 
serious cases—driving offenses, OWI, simple possession.”36 He 
also indicated the office strives to avoid withdrawing from Class 
A felonies, other than for conflict reasons.37 As discussed at 
length in Part V.D below, however, the chief appellate 
defender’s description about the office’s withdrawal practices is 
not entirely consistent with the data collected for 2012 and 2013. 
b. Court-Appointed Attorneys 
Indigent defendants who are not represented by the 
appellate defenders, and who do not elect to retain paid counsel, 
are represented by court-appointed attorneys. Under the State 
Public Defender (SPD)’s 2012–2013 rules, court-appointed 
attorneys in criminal appeals were paid $60 an hour, unless a 
contract with the SPD specified otherwise.38 Attorneys could not 
 32. Email from Steven Ainger, Classification & Compensation Program Coordinator, 
Iowa Dep’t of Admin. Servs., Question about June, 2013 Asst. Appellate Defender Salary 
Range (Jan. 29, 2016) (responding to author’s request for confirmation of 2013 salary 
information no longer available on DAS website) (on file with author).  
 33. IOWA CODE § 814.11(3) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code 
/2013/814.pdf.
 34. For clarity and consistency, I use “chief appellate defender” in this article to refer to 
the Iowa State Appellate Defender, who leads the Appellate Defender’s Office and 
supervises assistant appellate defenders. 
 35. Attachment to Swaim December Email, supra note 28. 
 36. Id.
 37. Id.
 38. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.4 (addressing rates in general), R. 493-124.4(3) 
(excepting contracted-for appellate rates from limits imposed by rule) (Dec. 25, 2013), 
available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/12-25-2013.493.pdf. This same 
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bill for clerical work, overheard, preparation of indigent-defense 
fee claims, or challenges to the SPD’s denial of a fee claim.39
And travel time to visit a client was only payable when the 
travel was “reasonable and necessary” to the representation.40
During the time period evaluated in this study, a fee cap of 
$2,400 was imposed on criminal appeals.41 An attorney could 
exceed this amount only after obtaining a court order 
authorizing a fee in excess of the cap.42
The State Public Defender did not maintain statistics 
concerning the experience of court-appointed attorneys during 
the period explored in this study.43
c. Privately Retained Counsel 
In Iowa, as is true elsewhere in the country, a small cadre 
of criminal defendants are represented by privately retained 
counsel, paid for by the defendant or his family. For purposes of 
this study, little information was available about the 
characteristics of this group of attorneys,44 other than the relative 
infrequency at which retained counsel appears in the sample.45
rate was applicable for the period of the study. See IOWA ADMIN. CODE. R. 493-12.4 (May 
30, 2012), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/05-30-2012.493.pdf. 
 39. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.5(3) (June 25, 2014), available at https://www.legis 
.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/06-25-2014.493.pdf; accord IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-7.1 
(Apr. 6, 2011) (defining terms including “in-court time,” “out-of-court time,” and 
“paralegal time”), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/04-06-2011.49 
3.pdf. 
 40. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.5(4)(c) (June 25, 2014), available at https://www 
.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/06-25-2014.493.pdf. 
 41. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.6(3) (May 30, 2012), available at https://www.legis 
.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/05-30-2012.493.pdf. The 2014 rule abolishes that limit. IOWA 
ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.6(3) (June 25, 2014), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/ 
docs/iac/agency/06-25-2014.493.pdf. 
 42. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-12.6(4) (May 30, 2012), available at https://www 
.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/05-30-2012.493.pdf. 
 43. See Attachment to Swaim December Email, supra note 28. 
 44. For example, no entity tracks information about the experience and workload of 
retained counsel because retained counsel are not accountable to the State or the State 
Public Defender. Retained counsel are accountable only to their clients and to market 
forces.
 45. Only 12.46 percent of all criminal defendants were represented by privately 
retained counsel in 2012–2013 appeals. See Table 20: Type of Counsel Overall (Pro Se 
Included), infra p. 249. Among the sample of appeals in which defendants were 
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2. The Attorney General’s Criminal Appeals Division 
Unlike defense counsel, who represent a number of 
different clients in the course of their careers, the State is 
represented in each and every criminal appeal by an assistant 
attorney general in the criminal appeals division of the Iowa 
Department of Justice.46 Under the Iowa Code, the Attorney 
General has sole responsibility for all criminal appeals before 
Iowa’s appellate courts.47 County attorneys cannot and do not 
appear as counsel of record in these cases.48
The State’s typical role in a criminal appeal is as the 
appellee, defending a district court judgment. The State is also 
authorized to appeal as a matter of right in certain limited 
circumstances, including dismissal or other legal judgment on an 
indictment, an order arresting judgment, or an order granting a 
new trial.49 The State has authority to seek discretionary review 
in an array of cases, including orders dismissing an arrest or 
search warrant, an order suppressing evidence, an order granting 
or denying change of venue, or any final judgment or order 
“raising a question of law important to the judiciary and the 
represented by counsel, retained counsel appear in 12.62 percent of appeals. See Table 19: 
Type of Counsel Overall (Pro Se Excluded), infra p. 249. 
 46. As a result of increased workload during the period studied in this article, the State 
was represented by volunteer attorneys from other divisions of the Attorney General’s 
office in approximately thirty-nine cases, or around four percent of criminal appeals in the 
sample. However, even when briefs were written by other-division volunteers (or division 
interns), briefs were reviewed by criminal-appeals staff before they were filed with the 
appellate courts. 
 47. IOWA CODE § 13.2(1)(a) (2013) (declaring that “[i]t shall be the duty of the 
attorney general, except as otherwise provided by law to . . . [p]rosecute and defend all 
causes in the appellate courts in which the state is a party or interested”), available at https: 
//www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/13.pdf.
 48. In re A.W., 741 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Iowa 2007) (“Absent a specific statutory 
directive to the contrary, county attorneys’ appearances in the appellate courts are limited 
to representation of the interests of the county [rather than the State].”); State v. Gill, 143 
N.W.2d 331, 332 (Iowa 1966) (“Ordinarily, a criminal case is under the control of the 
county attorney until the supreme court acquires jurisdiction, after which it is under the 
sole control of the attorney general.”). 
 49. IOWA CODE § 814.5(1) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/814.pdf.
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profession.”50 The State may also appeal discretionary 
reductions of certain mandatory-minimum sentences.51
C. The Appeals: Direct Appeals of Convictions 
and Postconviction-Relief Appeals 
At least as it relates to this study,52 there are two types of 
criminal appeals in Iowa: a direct appeal following conviction, 
and an appeal from the denial of postconviction relief following 
an unsuccessful application. 
A direct appeal is initiated by a criminal defendant filing a 
notice of appeal in the district court and in the Supreme Court of 
Iowa within thirty days of a final judgment—usually 
sentencing.53 All criminal convictions, other than a simple 
misdemeanor or ordinance-violation conviction, may be 
appealed as a matter of right.54 Over the 2012 and 2013 calendar 
years, direct appeals made up a majority of criminal appeals: 
768 out of 975 appeals included in this study, or 78.77 percent 
of criminal appeals. 
A postconviction-relief (PCR) appeal is initiated by a 
convicted criminal defendant55 filing a notice of appeal in the 
district court, also within thirty days of a final judgment—
usually an order denying postconviction relief.56 The right to 
 50. IOWA CODE § 814.5(2) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/814.pdf.
 51. IOWA CODE § 901.10(4) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code 
/2013/901.pdf.
 52. As discussed in more detail in Part IV, the population of “criminal appeals” studied 
in this article includes both direct appeals of criminal convictions and sentences, and 
appeals of postconviction-relief actions that challenge criminal convictions, which are 
technically civil in nature. See infra Part IV: The Original Study. 
 53. See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.101(1)(b) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/ 
docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf.
 54. IOWA CODE § 814.6 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/814.pdf. A simple misdemeanor or ordinance violation may be “appealed” by seeking 
discretionary review. IOWA CODE § 814.6(2)(d) (2013).
 55. These convicted criminal defendants are referred to as “applicants” in the captions 
of PCR cases. See generally IOWA CODE ch. 822 (2013) (describing application for 
postconviction relief and application process), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov 
/docs/code/2013/822.pdf.
 56. See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.101(1)(b) (2013).
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postconviction relief in Iowa is purely a creature of statute57 and 
the grounds specified in the Code include constitutional claims, 
sentencing issues, and newly discovered evidence, among 
others.58 Importantly, and unlike the system in some other states, 
ineffective-assistance claims in Iowa are “ordinarily” preserved 
for postconviction relief.59 An ineffective-assistance claim need 
not be raised on direct appeal and can be raised for the first time 
in an application for postconviction relief.60 An unsuccessful 
postconviction-relief application may be appealed by the 
defendant/applicant, and the State may appeal the grant of 
postconviction relief as a matter of right.61 Postconviction-relief 
appeals constitute a distinct minority of appeals included in this 
study: 207 out of 975 appeals, or 21.23 percent. 
Before proceeding to the narrow focus of this study—the 
effect of appellate counsel on appeal outcomes—it is useful to 
place Iowa’s overall criminal-appeals statistics in a broader 
context. There is no systematic breakdown of criminal appeals 
nationwide that shows the type of appellate reversal and the rate 
at which each occurs. One of the few sources for a glimpse of 
this data comes from a report published in 1989 by the National 
Center for State Courts that looked at criminal appeals before 
four intermediate appellate courts (in California, Colorado, 
Illinois, and Maryland) and one state court of last resort (in 
Rhode Island, which lacks an intermediate appellate court).62
The graph on the next page shows the differences and 
 57. What is now Iowa Code Chapter 822, previously Chapter 663A, “supplanted” 
Iowa’s common-law habeas remedy for convicted persons. See Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 
707, 709 (Iowa 1989). 
 58. IOWA CODE § 822. 2 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/822.pdf.
 59. E.g., State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494 (Iowa 2012) (noting that the Iowa 
Supreme Court will “ordinarily preserve such claims for postconviction relief 
proceedings”); accord State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Iowa 2003) (“Ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are generally preserved for post-conviction relief.”).  
 60. IOWA CODE § 814.7 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/814.pdf.
 61. IOWA CODE § 822.9 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/822.pdf.
 62. REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 4, at 3 n.*; see also James W. Meeker, Criminal 
Appeals Over the Last 100 Years, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 551 (1984) (indicating that defendants 
in the early-to-mid twentieth century were less likely to “win” on appeal than in the mid-to-
late nineteenth century).
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modification. Yet the breakdown on types of favorable action is 
also remarkably consistent between the Iowa data and the NCSC 
data. Though no statistical inferences can or should be drawn 
from this abbreviated comparison, the data suggest that 
criminal-appeal outcomes in Iowa are similar to those in other 
states. This, in turn, suggests that the data collected in the 
original study contained in Part IV may be applicable beyond 
Iowa’s borders, given the similar baseline for overall appellate 
outcomes. 
III. EXISTING RESEARCH ON DIFFERENCES IN
APPELLATE COUNSEL
One of few studies exploring the impact of different 
appellate counsel was Wasserman’s 1990 New York study, 
which compared briefing and outcomes between cases handled 
by an institutional appellate defender—the Criminal Appeals 
Bureau—and the conflict cases handled by court-appointed 
attorneys.65 Wasserman looked at 1,410 appellate cases,66 and 
his study had two components: one based on a qualitative 
evaluation of the briefs and one based on a quantitative 
evaluation of appeal outcomes. As to the briefs, Wasserman had 
eight retired appellate judges blindly review briefs filed by both 
CAB and the appointed attorneys. The judges rated the CAB 
briefs “modestly but consistently higher” than appointed 
attorneys’ briefs, and the judges found that as many as one 
quarter of the appointed attorneys’ briefs failed to raise 
meritorious issues, compared to just one of the CAB briefs.67
The judges also found that the appointed attorneys’ briefs were 
more likely to raise frivolous issues than the CAB briefs.68
The quantitative data collected by Wasserman also 
supported a difference between defenders, with some nuance. 
Wasserman collected the total number of cases in which 
defenders of both types obtained “favorable action” for their 
 65. WASSERMAN, supra note 3. CAB, an arm of New York City’s Legal Aid Society, 
operated as the institutional appellate defender because its contract provided that it was 
appointed for all indigent appellate representation, except for conflict cases. Id. at 44.
 66. Id. at 92.
 67. Id. at 65, 81.
 68. Id. at 81.
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clients, including reversal and dismissal, the grant of a new trial, 
dismissal of lesser-included offenses, correction of sentencing 
error, and other remands.69 He found that CAB obtained 
favorable action in 11.82 percent of cases, appointed attorneys 
obtained favorable action in 7.91 percent of cases, and privately 
retained counsel did so in 17.88 percent of cases.70 The 
differences between CAB and the appointed attorneys were 
statistically significant, as were the differences between those 
attorneys and the privately retained attorneys.71 The greatest 
differences between CAB and appointed attorneys were for the 
grant of a new trial and for re-sentencing, while CAB and 
appointed attorneys had identical rates of dismissals/acquittals.72
For sentencing reductions, CAB actually outperformed retained 
counsel: 2.68 percent of CAB clients obtained sentencing 
modifications, compared to 2.1 percent of retained-counsel 
clients.73
Ultimately, Wasserman concluded that “a defendant was 
more likely to prevail on appeal if he was assigned to CAB, 
because of its superior representation.”74 He devoted a chapter 
of his book to ruling out alternative causes for CAB’s success: 
He looked at CAB’s selection procedures and found no evidence 
of deliberate manipulation in case-screening, and limited support 
for any merit-based bias—such as an advantage possibly 
conveyed by the discretion accorded CAB in applying the 
conflict-of-interest rules—in selection of appeals.75 Further, 
Wasserman’s analysis of the data established that, even if there 
was a bias in selection, this could not account for all the 
variance in the performance of CAB versus the appointed 
attorneys.76
As partial explanation for these findings, Wasserman’s 
investigation revealed that there was “much fuller support for 
the city’s institutional defenders than for its assigned defenders,” 
 69. Id. at 90.
 70. Id. at 97.
 71. Id.
 72. Id. at 98–99.
 73. Id.
 74. Id. at 65 (outlining study’s structure and summarizing its results).
 75. Id. at 115–131, 130.
 76. Id. at 131.
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particularly in terms of a predictable salary, paid support staff, 
and covered office expenses.77 In contrast to the CAB, appointed 
attorneys were paid at an hourly rate that worked out to 
significantly less than the institutional defenders’ salary,78 they 
were not reimbursed for rent or support staff, and they paid for 
their own office supplies.79 He extrapolated from his data that 
the quality of advocacy makes a big difference in certain 
cases—like the grant of a new trial or sentencing correction—in 
which outcomes are “more dependent on skilled advocacy” than 
the “mechanical” type of analysis related to obtaining a 
dismissal of an indictment for a speedy-trial violation or other 
elementary reasons.80
When Wasserman wrote in 1990, “[e]mpirical research on 
the impact of appellate advocacy [was] virtually non-existent.”81
The landscape has changed little since then. Only two notable 
additions appear in the literature, and they raise more questions 
than they provide answers. First, the National Center for State 
Courts study rejected Wasserman’s claim that appellate counsel 
makes a difference in the overall rate of favorable action, and 
found “weak” statistical support for the notion that public 
defenders win “bigger” than court-appointed attorneys.82
Second, a short study of Florida appellate decisions found that 
the assignment of counsel (whether a public defender or a court-
appointed attorney) was not a significant factor in predicting 
appellate outcomes.83
Looking beyond the impact of counsel on appeal, there is a 
body of research exploring whether type of counsel makes a 
difference for criminal defendants at the trial level. The results 
of these studies, however, are mixed. A 1982 study of 48,000 
trial-level case records in Virginia found that public defenders 
were more likely to obtain dismissals for their clients and that 
 77. Id. at 44–45.
 78. Id. at 44–45, 52.
 79. Id. at 45.
 80. Id. at 99.
 81. Id. at 63.
 82. REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 4, at 40
 83. Williams, supra note 4. Based on his results, Williams reasoned that indigent 
defendants were not afforded inferior counsel, in part because the prevailing perception 
among judges is that most criminal appeals are “frivolous, hopeless, and routine.” Id. at 
282 (citations omitted).
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 31 Side B      05/10/2016   12:12:25
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 31 Side B      05/10/2016   12:12:25
BULLERRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2016 1:02 PM 
200 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
their trials were less likely to result in a guilty verdict.84 That 
study also found that privately retained counsel performed better 
than either type of indigent counsel on the same measures.85
Other studies have found that retained counsel are more likely to 
obtain deferred dispositions,86 and that retained counsel take 
more cases to trial and obtain proportionally more acquittals.87
Still other data show retained counsel filed more motions than 
court-appointed attorneys,88 and that retained counsel visited 
clients sooner after arrest.89
A number of studies also explore whether sentencing 
outcomes vary across types of counsel. One 2005 study found 
the type of representation “slightly significant” (at ten percent 
confidence) between private and public-expense counsel, and 
found that public defenders obtain sentences that are 8.9 months 
shorter than those obtained by private counsel.90 Another study, 
released the same year, found that public defenders under-
performed retained counsel and court-appointed attorneys in 
sentencing outcomes.91 The study attributed this difference to 
84. See LARRY J. COHEN, ET AL., ASSIGNED COUNSEL VS. PUBLIC DEFENDER 
SYSTEMS IN VIRGINIA (1982). Specifically, the study found that thirty-five percent of the 
public defenders’ cases involved a dismissal, while the rate was only twenty-six percent for 
court-appointed attorneys. Id. at 35. Of note, this statistic includes cases in which the 
prosecutor ultimately declined to file further charges or declined to proceed on the 
indictment. Id.
 85. The study found that retained counsel obtained dismissals in 46.2 percent of cases 
and only 50 percent of cases with retained counsel resulted in a guilty verdict. Id.
 86.  Joyce S. Sterling, Retained Counsel Versus the Public Defender: The Impact of 
Type of Counsel on Charge Bargaining, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 151, 160–62 (William 
McDonald, ed., 1983). The same research shows, however, that public defenders obtain 
more charge reductions. See id. at 161–62. 
 87. Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases, 
Prior Records, and Leniency in Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 253 (1989). 
 88. Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New 
York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 766–70 (1986–87). 
 89. See ROGER A. HANSON ET AL., INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND 
DONE WELL (1992).
 90. Elaine L. Hill, Does the Type of Legal Representation Affect Sentencing Outcomes?
1 UNDERGRAD. ECON. REV. 17 (2005). 
 91. Morris B. Hoffman, Paul H. Rubin, & Joanna M. Shepherd, An Empirical Study of 
Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the “Marginally Indigent”, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 223, 242 (2005) (including figures 4 and 5).  Like the study presented in this 
article, the Hoffman, Rubin, & Shepherd piece divides counsel into three groups: public 
defenders, court-appointed attorneys, and retained counsel. Id. at 233–34. The specific 
findings of the study were that public defenders’ clients received nearly five years longer 
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“marginally indigent” defendants retaining counsel in cases in 
which representation might affect the outcome.92
An unpublished study from 2007 explored differences in 
trial-level outcomes in the federal arena, where representation 
was essentially random.93 The study found that clients of 
attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act were found 
guilty 2.6 percent more often than clients represented by the 
federal public defender,94 and those court-appointed attorneys’ 
clients received prison terms that were seven months longer on 
average.95 In other words, the study found that federal public 
defenders obtain better outcomes. The author of this study 
posited that, at least in part, these differences can be explained 
by the federal public defenders having stronger academic 
credentials, more experience, and better wages.96
Another study, from 2011, showed similar results.97 The 
2011 study looked at an assortment of counties and controlled 
for variables that were not consistent between states, like offense 
type.98 The study found that clients of court-appointed attorneys 
were 2.8 percent more likely to be found guilty, were 5.2 percent 
more likely to be convicted on the most serious count of the 
indictment, and were on average sentenced to longer terms of 
incarceration.99 Their cases also took longer to resolve from 
arrest to adjudication.100 This study also found that a one-dollar 
increase in the hourly pay of some types of court-appointed-
attorneys correlated with shorter expected sentences.101
More recently, a 2012 study explored differences in 
outcomes between court-appointed attorneys and public 
terms of imprisonment than the average private attorneys’ clients and court-appointed 
attorneys’ clients. Id. at 241–44. 
 92. See id. at 245–50. 
 93. Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent Defense 
Counsel 8–11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 2007), 
available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/iyengarr/indigent_defense.pdf . 
 94. Id. at 23. 
 95. Id. at 24. 
 96. Id. at 28. 
 97. Michael A. Roach, Indigent Defense Counsel, Attorney Quality, and Defendant 
Outcomes, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 577 (2014). 
 98. Id. at 598.  
 99. Id. at 602. 
 100. Id.
 101. Id. at 607.
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defenders in Philadelphia.102 The Philadelphia study provides 
one of the better analyses, as it’s based on a system that is 
almost purely random: Every fifth person charged with murder 
in Philadelphia is assigned to the public defender’s office at 
arraignment, while the remainder are represented by court-
appointed attorneys.103 The results “suggest that defense counsel 
makes an enormous difference in the outcomes of cases, even in 
the most serious cases—in which one might hope that the 
particular type of defense lawyer would matter least.”104
Contrasted with appointed counsel, the public defenders’ clients 
were nineteen percent less likely to be convicted of murder, their 
clients were sixty-two percent less likely to receive a life 
sentence, and their clients who received prison sentences served 
twenty-four percent less time.105
These studies, and others not cited here, fail to paint a clear 
picture.106 If anything, the take-away from the existing research 
is that the data are inconsistent and any meta-analysis would be 
muddled. Some studies find public defenders are more 
“effective” (measured in various ways) than court-appointed 
attorneys and public defenders, while others come to the 
opposite conclusion or express inconsistent findings. These 
studies, almost universally, focus on trial-level results. No study, 
other than Wasserman’s in 1990, has conclusively explored the 
effectiveness of indigent counsel at the appellate level and 
differentiated among types of appellate outcomes. The original 
study discussed in the next part aims to fill this gap using data 
from cases before the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
IV. THE ORIGINAL STUDY
To explore whether the type of representation makes a 
difference in Iowa criminal appeals, I designed an original 
 102. James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? 
The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012). 
 103. Id. at 159. 
 104. Id.
 105. Id. at 159, 179–84. 
 106. See Ronald F. Wright & Ralph A. Peeples, Criminal Defense Lawyer Moneyball: A 
Demonstration Project, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221, 1240 (2013) (describing the results 
of existing research as “varied” and “conflicting”). 
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empirical study to compare litigation conducted by appellate 
defenders, court-appointed attorneys, and retained counsel. I lay 
out the methodology and coding scheme below, and I include 
the coding rubric in the appendix, to enable replication. 
A. Methodology 
From the outset, I confess I was not designing an 
experiment on a blank slate. The variables I chose to measure, 
and the formation of my initial hypotheses, were no doubt 
colored by my anecdotal experience as an appellate prosecutor. I 
frequently prosecute cases in which I face different types of 
counsel, and it would be disingenuous to suggest that some bias 
did not pre-dispose my views when conducting the study. To 
mitigate any preconceptions I may have had, the measures relied 
on in completing this study are only those that can be 
empirically verified and objectively demonstrated by a search of 
publicly available court dockets and opinions available on the 
Iowa judicial branch website. 
I designed the study to encompass two calendar years of 
criminal cases before the Iowa Court of Appeals, including 
direct criminal appeals and postconviction cases. As described 
below, I relied on publicly available sources to collect data 
related to each individual case included in the study. 
1. Sample Selection 
In defining the parameters of the study, I relied on the Iowa 
judicial branch website to create a list of decisions issued by the 
Court of Appeals between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 
2013.107 I removed duplicate cases from my sample, after 
reviewing both opinions.108 I reviewed all cases that listed the 
 107. Slip opinions dating back to 1998 are available on the judicial branch website. See
Opinion Archive, IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.iowacourts.gov/ 
About_the_Courts/Court_of_Appeals/Court_of_Appeals_Opinions/Opinions _Archive/ 
(accessed Dec. 10, 2015; copy of main search page on file with Journal of Appellate 
Practice and Process). I did not use a “term” system (as compared to a “calendar” system) 
to determine the sample because Iowa’s Court of Appeals does not follow a publicly 
announced term system. 
 108. Some cases were posted twice following a successful petition for rehearing; in that 
situation, only the final disposition of the case is accounted for in the study’s data. 
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State of Iowa as a party and omitted non-criminal cases, such as 
tort cases against the State, disputes related to Department of 
Corrections policy or procedures, and juvenile cases. I also 
removed appeals by the State109 and cases that solely concerned 
commitments of persons as sexually violent predators (SVPs), 
even though SVP cases are handled in the district court by the 
Attorney General’s area prosecutions division, and later 
defended by the criminal appeals division after a verdict.110
2. Hypotheses 
Based on the available data, and the limited number of non-
subjective potential metrics, I formed hypotheses in four areas 
concerning the effectiveness of appellate counsel. First, the 
number of favorable outcomes—the bottom line for defendants 
who want a “win” on appeal to obtain a new trial, reduce their 
sentencing exposure, or obtain an acquittal. Second, the number 
of technical or procedural defects in the parties’ filings, as 
reflected in public docket entries. Third, whether counsel fully 
exhausted the appellate process, preserving potential federal 
habeas claims for their clients by seeking further review. And 
fourth, whether lawyers that received unfavorable outcomes 
before the Court of Appeals were able to successfully obtain 
further review by the Supreme Court. 
Based on my desire to investigate these four areas, I made 
the following hypotheses comparing the appellate defenders and 
court-appointed attorneys: 
1. The appellate defenders more frequently obtain 
favorable outcomes for clients. 
 109. See generally Table 23: State/Attorney General as Litigant, infra p. 250, for some 
relevant statistics concerning State’s appeals. 
 110. No SVPs obtained favorable outcomes before the Court of Appeals in 2012 or 
2013. In all seventeen SVP appeals, respondents facing commitment as sexually violent 
predators were represented by attorneys from the State Public Defender’s Special Defense 
Unit. And in all seventeen cases, the jury verdict or court judgment was affirmed. As 
relevant to the statistics compiled for this study, the public defenders sought further review 
in 11.76 percent of cases and obtained further review in none. The rates of stricken filings 
and defaults were both 5.88 percent in SVP cases. Although the comparison is not neat—
SVP cases differ from criminal appeals in a number of ways—these data points put the 
Special Defense Unit lawyers’ performance much closer to the performance of court-
appointed attorneys than to that of the appellate defenders. See infra Parts IV.B.1–IV.B.4. 
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2. The appellate defenders have fewer technical and 
procedural problems litigating before the appellate 
courts.
3. The appellate defenders more frequently exhaust 
the state appellate process by seeking further 
review. 
4. The appellate defenders more frequently obtain 
further review by the Supreme Court following an 
unfavorable outcome. 
I did not form a specific hypothesis about the performance 
of the appellate defenders as compared to retained counsel 
(given that I expected comparatively few retained-counsel 
appeals in the sample period). However, my expectation before 
completing the study was in line with Wasserman’s findings and 
the conventional wisdom that retained counsel generally 
perform better than indigent counsel, whether court-appointed or 
part of an institutional defender system.111
3. Coding 
To compile the statistics at the heart of this piece, I 
designed a coding rubric to use while reviewing individual 
judicial opinions and Iowa appellate-court dockets. The full 
coding rubric is included as Appendix A.112 The rubric was used 
to record raw data into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, which 
 111. The comparatively higher performance of retained counsel could be based on a 
variety of factors including that their cases involve “fewer violent crimes, more 
sympathetic clients, and greater possibilities for error in more complex cases.” 
WASSERMAN, supra note 3, at 89. Wasserman posits, I think correctly, that the greatest 
advantage for retained counsel is the self-selection of cases by both attorney and client: 
Retained attorneys can turn down hopeless cases and their clients are unlikely to pay 
potentially substantial legal fees for appeals that do not have at least some probability of 
success. See id. at 89.
 112. The rubric included at Appendix A is substantially similar to the rubric used during 
the coding process, with better proofreading and without handwritten reminders in the 
margin. The only exception is in the coding rules for the severity of the offense; this was 
done separately and subsequent to the initial coding, based on additional information from 
the chief appellate defender. See Attachment to Swaim December Email, supra note 28. 
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was later reviewed for data cleanup—misspellings, data 
recorded in the wrong column, and the like.113
Coding in the individual areas is explained in broad strokes 
below. This information, combined with the rubric in Appendix 
A, should be sufficient for any independent researcher to verify 
my findings. 
a. Coding for Outcome 
Outcomes were coded in two ways: once broadly and once 
narrowly. The broad categorization was for whether the outcome 
was favorable or unfavorable to the defendant. Unfavorable 
outcomes, from the perspective of a criminal defendant, include 
cases in which the judgment is either affirmed in whole or the 
appeal is dismissed.114 All other outcomes were classified as 
favorable.
The basis for the outcome-coding decision was the full text 
of the judicial opinion published on the judicial branch website. 
All opinions include a bolded directive concerning outcome at 
the end of the opinion, though often this is abbreviated and only 
makes sense in the context of the preceding language in the 
opinion. Coding for the particular type of favorable outcome 
was governed by the rules set forth in the coding rubric. In short, 
three types of outcomes were coded: “acquitted” if the Court of 
Appeals reversed for dismissal or otherwise vacated a conviction 
with jeopardy; “new trial” if a new trial was ordered or a 
reversal was ordered without the attachment of jeopardy;115 and 
“re-sentenced” if a sentence was modified or remanded for a 
new sentencing hearing.116
 113. The raw data spreadsheet is on file with the author. 
 114. A dismissal is equivalent to an affirmance because they have the same practical 
effect: The original judgment (conviction or sentence) is left intact. 
 115. “New trial” is the default coding for any non-sentencing reversal because the Iowa 
Code provides that, “[i]f a judgment against the defendant is reversed, such reversal shall 
be deemed an order for a new trial, unless the appellate court shall direct a different 
disposition.” IOWA CODE § 814.22 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs 
/code/2013/814.pdf. Consistent with this section, I coded outcomes as “acquittals” only if 
that outcome was directed by the Court of Appeals opinion. 
 116. Iowa’s appellate courts have authority to either directly modify a sentence on 
appeal (to reduce it) or remand the case for a district court judge to enter an order 
modifying a sentence. See IOWA CODE § 814.20 (2013) (“The appellate court, after an 
examination of the entire record, may dispose of the case by affirmation, reversal or 
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b. Coding for Procedural and Technical Defects 
There is generally no clear statement in judicial opinions as 
to whether a party has failed to comply with procedural rules 
concerning appellate practice,117 but the Iowa Courts Online 
docket for appeals does contain several cues that provide a 
barometer for these deficiencies. Based on the information 
available in the online docketing system, I tracked cases in 
which the clerk of appellate courts or a single-justice order118
struck defense filings, required defense counsel to re-file 
documents, or entered a default and fine for failure to comply 
with the rules. For purposes of coding, documents were coded as 
“stricken” if they were stricken by an order or if a letter from the 
clerk compelled counsel to file amended documents. A default 
was coded only in circumstances in which the court formally 
entered an order of default, and a default was not coded when 
the default was formally withdrawn by a subsequent order or 
notation by the clerk’s staff. 
c. Coding for Further-Review Applications and Further- 
Review Grants and Denials 
Coding for data concerning applications for further review 
was based solely on the online appellate docket. The docketing 
system records when an application is filed and who files the 
application. These records allow for coding based on whether an 
application was filed by counsel or by a defendant pro se. Only 
applications made by counsel were recorded. The docketing 
system also records the disposition of an application through an 
modification of the district court judgment. The appellate court may also . . . reduce the 
punishment, but shall not increase it.”), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/814.pdf.
 117. On occasion, opinions do include a comment about procedural and technical 
defects. See, e.g., State v. Lange, 831 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Rule 
infractions are not a trivial matter.”).
 118. The overwhelming majority of non-dispositional orders before the Iowa Supreme 
Court are single-justice orders. See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.1002(5) (2013) (providing that “a 
single justice or senior judge of the supreme court may entertain any motion in an appeal or 
original proceeding in the supreme court and grant or deny any relief which may properly 
be sought by motion, except that a single justice or senior judge may not dismiss, affirm, 
reverse, or otherwise determine an appeal or original proceeding”), available at https: 
//www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf.
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order issued by the chief justice—it will list the application as 
either “granted” or “denied,” and the data was coded 
accordingly. 
d. Coding for Offense Severity 
Given the chief appellate defender’s statement about the 
office’s withdrawal process,119 I also coded each appeal for 
offense severity. Because many criminal defendants are 
convicted of multiple crimes, I based offense-severity coding on 
the top count (most severe offense) for which a defendant was 
originally convicted in the district court. 
Coding was based on the hierarchy of offenses laid out in 
the Iowa Code. Iowa has four broad classifications of felonies—
Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D—that generally 
correspond to the punishments of life in prison, twenty-five 
years in prison, ten years in prison, and five years in prison, 
respectively.120 There are three classifications of 
misdemeanors—aggravated, serious, and simple—that generally 
correspond to two years in prison, one year in the county jail, 
and thirty days in the county jail, respectively.121 The coding for 
this study does not reflect the handful of offenses that deviate 
from these general punishments,122 or crimes that potentially 
carry enhancements, unless the enhancement elevates the felony 
 119. See supra Part II.B.1.a; see also Attachment to Swaim December Email, supra note 
28 (noting the AD withdrew from Class A felonies only when the office could not 
undertake representation due to a conflict, that the AD staff “try to keep the more serious 
cases,” and that the office tries to “generally withdraw from the less serious cases—driving 
offenses, OWI, simple possession”).
 120. IOWA CODE § 902.9 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/902.pdf.
 121. IOWA CODE § 903.1 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/903.pdf.
 122. For example, while second-degree murder is a Class B felony, it carries a 
punishment of fifty years in prison, rather than twenty-five years. See IOWA CODE
§ 707.3(2) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/707.pdf. On 
the other end of the spectrum, possession of marijuana (first offense) is a serious 
misdemeanor with a reduced maximum sentence of six months in jail, rather than one year. 
See IOWA CODE § 124.401(5) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/124.pdf.
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classification (rather than only modifying the applicable 
penalty).123
I caution the reader that, if reliability concerns are present 
anywhere in my data, it is likely here. Unlike the procedure that 
involves following relatively explicit cues for the other coding 
segments, coding for offense severity takes some detective 
work. Judicial opinions rarely contain an explicit statement that 
a criminal defendant has been convicted of Crime X, a Class Y 
felony. I based my coding on this information where it was 
available. For opinions that included a clear statement of the 
conviction at issue without identifying the severity of the 
offense, I used the sentencing charts utilized by Iowa 
practitioners to look up the corresponding offense’s severity 
based on code section and the name of the crime.124 Where there 
was ambiguity as to the offense at issue or where the name of 
the offense alone was not sufficient to determine an offense 
level,125 I used Iowa Courts Online126 to find how the district 
court clerk had docketed the adjudication on the top count and 
used that information.127 For a handful of postconviction cases, 
district court dockets were not clear or incomplete,128 and I 
 123. Compare IOWA CODE § 902.14 (2013) (elevated penalty classification for sex-
crime offenders), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/902.pdf with
IOWA CODE ch. 901A (2013) (enhanced penalties for sexually predatory offenses, no 
increase in offense classification), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/901A.pdf.
 124. See Michael Mullins, J., Iowa Ct. App., Sentencing Summary Chart, OFFICE OF THE 
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER (2007–2014), https://spd.iowa.gov/defense-resources/sentencing 
-summary-chart. If the code year was available in an opinion, I used the corresponding 
year’s chart. If the offense date was not clear, I relied on the 2012 chart. 
 125. For example, identity theft under Iowa Code section 715A.8(3) could be a Class D 
felony or an aggravated misdemeanor depending on the amount fraudulently obtained. See
IOWA CODE § 715A.8(3) (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/ 
715A.pdf. Both types of convictions would be entered under the same code section. 
 126. See Iowa Courts, Online Search (n.d.), https://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us (offering 
online search function for appellate cases). 
 127. Specifically, for these cases, I used the Supreme Court number (e.g., 12-1234) to 
look up the appellate docket for the appeal and then locate the district-court case number. I 
then looked up the district court docket and navigated to “criminal charges/disposition.” 
 128. Cases that involve appeals of a deferred judgment are particularly difficult to 
reconstruct from district-court records because, by statute, a deferred judgment drops off 
the publicly accessible docket after the defendant’s term on probation is complete. See
IOWA CODE § 907.1(1) (2013) (describing the deferred judgment process); § 907.4 (2013) 
(explaining the deferred judgment docket), both available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/ 
docs/code/2013/907.pdf.
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The fourth hypothesis revealed perhaps the most striking 
difference between types of counsel.140 As seen on the preceding 
graph, the appellate defenders obtained further review by the 
Supreme Court in eighteen cases during the sample period, 
which works out to 4.33 percent of their cases that were 
affirmed in whole.141 In stark contrast, court-appointed attorneys 
obtained further review in zero cases, failing to garner Supreme 
Court review with any of their 136 applications for further 
review. Retained counsel just slightly outpaced the appellate 
defenders, obtaining further review in five cases—5.21 percent 
of the cases they lost.142
V. ANALYSIS
The analytic component of this piece includes both the 
expected exploration of whether the data supported or refuted 
my hypotheses, as well as some unexpected findings. The 
empirical data ultimately support the notion that appellate 
defenders provide better representation—at least on the metrics 
explored in this study. The data also put the appellate defenders 
roughly on par with privately retained counsel, suggesting that 
even wealthy defendants cannot purchase an advantage much 
beyond counsel provided at public expense by government 
employees. 
Moving away from the hypothesized results, the data also 
support the unexpected finding that appellate defenders not only 
win more, but win differently—they excel at obtaining 
sentencing reductions, have charges acquitted with prejudice 
slightly more often than court-appointed attorneys, and they 
obtain new trials more often than court-appointed attorneys but 
far less often than their privately retained counterparts. The final 
 140. As with the rate of favorable outcomes, the State’s rate of obtaining further review 
differs significantly from that of criminal defendants: The State obtained further review in 
seven of twenty applications during the study, for a rate of 35.00 percent. See Table 23: 
State/Attorney General as Litigant, infra p. 250. 
 141. Presented differently, appellate defenders succeeded on 5.44 percent of their 
applications for further review, securing review in 18 of 331 cases. See Table 9: Proportion 
of Further-Review Applications Granted, infra p. 245. 
 142. Presented differently, retained counsel succeeded on 9.26 percent of their 
applications for further review (five of fifty-four). See id.
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 39 Side A      05/10/2016   12:12:25
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 39 Side A      05/10/2016   12:12:25
BULLERRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2016 1:02 PM 
PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND APPOINTED COUNSEL ON APPEAL 215
piece of analysis returns to the case-assignment discussion from 
Part II.B.1.a and calls into question whether, as the chief 
appellate defender reported, his office keeps more serious cases: 
The overall data show that court-appointed attorneys and 
appellate defenders handled cases of almost identical offense 
severity during the period studied. 
A. On All Four Objective Measures, Appellate Defenders 
Provide Better Representation than Court-Appointed Attorneys. 
This study was designed to measure empirical data in four 
areas in which the quality of counsel was thought to make a 
difference: outcomes, procedures, exhausting the appellate 
process, and obtaining further review. In all four areas, lawyers 
from the Iowa Appellate Defender’s Office outperformed court-
appointed attorneys for indigent defendants. As explained at 
greater length below, the data on these measures suggest that the 
appellate defenders have an institutional advantage and provide 
better representation to their clients than most court-appointed 
attorneys. 
As to the first measure, the appellate defenders produced 
nearly twice as many “wins” for their clients than court-
appointed attorneys. For a criminal defendant, one might expect 
that obtaining favorable action on appeal is the most important 
metric for assessing whether counsel was effective.143 Criminal 
defendants file notices of appeal hoping for a reduction in 
sentence, to have their convictions set aside, or for a new trial—
and the data suggest the appellate defenders are better at 
achieving these goals than appointed attorneys. 
The second measure provides a more indirect rating of 
counsel’s effectiveness, though the difference between types of 
counsel on this measure suggests a profound difference in the 
documents filed by public defenders (who specialize in appeals) 
and court-appointed attorneys (who may or may not have 
extensive appellate experience). The appellate defenders’ filings 
were basically without problems—just one assistant appellate 
defender was defaulted for missing a deadline, and only three 
 143. See Hoffman et al., supra note 91, at 225 (“What criminal defendants care most 
about . . . is the actual outcome of the case.”).
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cases involved stricken filings. Even combining defaults and 
stricken filings, the appellate defenders had procedural problems 
in 0.78 percent of the cases they handled. Court-appointed 
attorneys’ cases were plagued by problems: They were defaulted 
in 22.62 percent of appeals and their filings were stricken in 
29.76 percent of appeals. Do these data prove that better 
filings—at least in the sense that they comply with appellate 
rules, or come close enough to survive a motion to strike—lead 
to better representation? Not causally. One would expect that, if 
increased compensation led to better representation, retained 
counsel would have the fewest number of procedural and 
technical defects; instead, the appellate defenders far 
outperformed retained counsel on this process metric and 
retained counsel performed nearly as poorly as the court-
appointed attorneys on the rate of defaults.144 All this being said, 
the disparity between the appellate defenders’ filings, and the 
concomitant higher rate of favorable outcomes compared to 
court-appointed attorneys, suggests this is a distinction that may 
make a difference. 
Third, the appellate defenders sought further review in a 
much greater proportion of their losses before the Court of 
Appeals. This matters for purposes of seeking federal habeas 
corpus relief, as “an Iowa prisoner whose appeal is deflected to 
the Iowa Court of Appeals must file an application for further 
review in the Supreme Court of Iowa to exhaust his claims 
properly in the state courts.”145 Prisoners who do not exhaust 
state appeals are procedurally barred and effectively locked out 
of federal habeas.146 As a result of these legal rules, the appellate 
defenders—by filing more applications for further review—
provide clients a second and third bite at the apple: once in front 
of the Iowa Supreme Court and then another (if there are viable 
federal constitutional issues) in the federal district courts. 
Fourth, the appellate defenders were able to get cases to the 
Supreme Court with some regularity, whereas court-appointed 
attorneys failed to do so with any of their more than 100 
 144. Retained counsel were defaulted in 21.95 percent of cases (compared to 22.62 
percent for court-appointed attorneys) and their pleadings were stricken in 21.95 percent of 
cases (compared to 29.76 percent of cases for court-appointed attorneys). 
 145. Welch v. Lund, 616 F.3d 756, 759 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 146. See id. at 759–60. 
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applications during the sample period.147 On eighteen occasions, 
the appellate defenders brought issues to the Supreme Court on 
further review from the Court of Appeals.148 This statistic 
matters for both speculative and concrete reasons. If the other 
measures are to be believed—and appellate defenders are better 
advocates than court-appointed lawyers—this fourth metric, 
concerning grants of further review, may be an indirect 
barometer of how the Iowa Supreme Court perceives counsel’s 
performance. A detailed report concerning the United States 
Supreme Court argues that those Justices favor granting 
certiorari to petitions filed by leading Supreme Court advocates 
because the cases will be better argued, because good issues 
have been identified,149 and—as a different commentator has 
described it—because these appellate specialists “speak the 
court’s language.”150 Given that the data here show appellate-
defender applications are granted about four percent of the time, 
and that number is zero for court-appointed attorneys, one might 
speculate that a similar bias in selection toward “better” 
lawyering is present at Iowa’s Supreme Court. 
The concrete reason that success on further-review 
applications matters for criminal defendants is that Iowa’s Court 
 147. Pronounced differences between types of counsel are not unheard of. In the 
Philadelphia study comparing public defenders and appointed counsel for murder 
defendants, the public defenders had a striking record: None of their clients ever received 
the death penalty, compared to two percent of all criminal defendants. See Anderson & 
Heaton, supra note 102, at 182–83.
 148. The appellate defenders’ rate of obtaining discretionary further review in criminal 
appeals is in line with the data in other states. The appellate defenders obtained further 
review 4.33 percent of the time (and retained counsel obtained further review 5.21 percent 
of the time), compared to the overall rates of 4.1 percent in California, 5.6 percent in 
Illinois, and 6.7 percent in Maryland. See REVERSIBLE ERROR, supra note 4, at 43 n.3.
 149. See generally Joan Biskupic, Janet Roberts and John Shiffman, The Echo Chamber: 
At America’s Court of Last Resort, A Handful of Lawyers Now Dominates the Docket,
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/ (Dec. 8, 2014) (indicating that 
Justice Scalia will “in some instances . . . vote against hearing a case if he fears it will be 
presented poorly and he expects another opportunity to rule on the issues the case 
presents”). If Iowa’s Supreme Court justices engage in a similar analysis when a court-
appointed further-review application presents an issue poorly, they may deny that 
application and instead grant an appellate-defender application that they know will be 
better argued. 
 150. See Dahlia Lithwick, Amicus: The Super Lawyers (Slate podcast, Jan. 10, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/podcasts/amicus/2015/01/dahlia_lithwick_speaks_with_joan
_biskupic_about_supreme_court_bar_s_lack.html (Jan. 2015) (discussing Biskupic et al., 
supra note 149). 
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of Appeals is bound by Supreme Court decisions.151 On any 
issue for which the defendant has urged a change—or even an 
expansion—of the law, the only viable opportunity to obtain a 
victory is before the Supreme Court, and the data show that is an 
opportunity unlikely to present itself when a defendant is 
represented by court-appointed attorneys.152 Also, defendants 
fare better before the Supreme Court than the Court of Appeals, 
winning about half of granted further-review applications.153
This suggests that criminal defendants who cannot get in front of 
the Supreme Court are missing out on a meaningful opportunity 
for relief. 
B. The Appellate Defenders and Privately Retained Counsel 
Provide Comparable Representation, Given the Mixed Results 
on the Objective Measures. 
When compared to privately retained counsel, the data are a 
mixed bag for the appellate defenders. Retained counsel 
obtained favorable outcomes slightly more often.154 Appellate 
defenders sought further review more often,155 but retained 
 151. E.g., State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (“We are not at 
liberty to overturn Iowa Supreme Court precedent.”). The Court of Appeals is also bound 
by its own published opinions, which can only be overturned en banc or by the Supreme 
Court. See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.904(2)(c) (2013) (noting that unpublished opinions, in 
contrast to published opinions, “shall not constitute controlling legal authority”), available
at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf.
 152. One might wonder whether court-appointed attorneys’ low number of successful 
further-reviews applications is mitigated by cases retained by the Supreme Court. During 
2012–2013, the Supreme Court retained seventeen criminal appeals by defendants: seven 
by appellate defenders (41.18 percent), six by court-appointed attorneys (35.29 percent), 
and four by retained counsel (25.53 percent). See Table 24: Retained Cases (2012–2013), 
infra p. 251. This is in line with the court-appointed attorneys’ overall representation rate 
(34.46 percent) before the Court of Appeals. Compare id. with Table 19: Type of Counsel 
Overall (Pro Se Excluded), infra p. 249. 
 153. Of the twenty-three further-review applications filed by defendants and granted in 
2012 and 2013, 52.17 percent of defendants (twelve) obtained favorable action; 39.13 
percent (nine) had their convictions affirmed outright; and two defendants died, mooting 
two appeals (8.70 percent of cases granted further review). See Table 25: Outcomes of 
Cases Granted Further Review (2012–2013), infra p. 251. 
 154. Retained counsel obtained favorable action in 21.9 percent of appeals, compared to 
19.38 percent for the appellate defenders. See Table 1: Favorable Action, infra p. 242. 
 155. Appellate defenders sought further review in 79.57 percent of appeals, compared to 
retained counsel’s seeking further review in 56.25 percent of appeals. See Table 7: Further 
Review Sought Following Loss, infra p. 245. 
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counsel had a higher proportion of granted applications.156
Appellate defenders’ favorable outcomes included a greater 
proportion of charges acquitted with prejudice, while retained 
counsel obtained new trials more often than sentencing 
reductions.157 The only area in which the appellate defenders 
significantly outpaced retained counsel was on procedural and 
technical defects.158
It’s hard to declare a clear winner of this particular 
comparison—other than the victory of the appellate defenders 
on the technical niceties of appellate practice. Given the makeup 
and economic motivation of each group, that disparity makes 
some sense: Appellate defenders practice criminal-appellate law 
full-time on a salary and are familiar with the ins and outs of 
appellate procedure; it’s unlikely that any privately retained 
attorneys can do the same, given the small number of criminal 
appellants who can afford to pay.159 The other, more-mixed 
results suggest that neither appellate defenders nor retained 
counsel have a clear advantage. Wasserman, the author of the 
New York criminal-appeals study, reasoned that the grant of a 
new trial or sentencing correction was the type of outcome 
“more dependent on skilled advocacy” than the “mechanical” 
analysis related to obtaining a dismissal on speedy-trial 
grounds;160 if he is right, the data still split the difference—
retained counsel obtain proportionally more new trials, while 
 156. Retained counsel succeeded on 9.26 percent of applications, while appellate 
defenders succeeded on 5.44 percent. See Table 9: Proportion of Further-Review 
Applications Granted, infra p. 245. In the total percentage of losses in which further review 
was granted, retained counsel still come out slightly ahead with 5.21 percent of their 
appeals, compared to 4.33 percent for appellate defenders. See Table 8: Further Review 
Obtained Following Loss, infra p. 245. 
 157. See Table 2: Acquitted, infra p. 242; Table 3: New Trial, infra p. 242; Table 4: Re-
Sentenced, infra p. 243. 
 158. Just 0.19 percent of appellate-defender appeals involved a default, compared to 
21.95 percent of retained-counsel appeals, and just 0.58 percent of appellate-defender 
filings were stricken, compared to 21.95 percent of retained-counsel filings. See Table 5: 
Defaults, infra p. 244; Table 6: Stricken Filings, infra p. 244. 
 159. Among privately retained counsel, the greatest number of appeals handled in 2012 
and 2013 was seven appeals by Alfredo Parrish. It seems unlikely that 3.5 criminal appeals 
per year could sustain any law practice, though some lawyers may also practice appellate 
law in other areas. Because Iowa does not certify “specialists” for purposes of lawyer 
advertising, it is difficult to gauge the prevalence (or scarcity) of full-time appellate 
practitioners. 
 160. WASSERMAN, supra note 3, at 99.
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appellate defenders obtain more re-sentencings. One could 
puzzle out whether a slight edge on any particular metric truly 
makes appellate defenders or court-appointed lawyers better for 
criminal defendants, but the easier—and perhaps more 
accurate—conclusion is that the performance of the two groups 
is comparable. 
C. An Unexpected Result: Appellate Defenders Win Differently 
and Outperform Court-Appointed Attorneys Most Significantly 
on Sentencing Issues. 
The hypotheses for this study correctly anticipated that the 
appellate defenders’ overall number of “wins” would 
substantially outpace court-appointed attorneys, but drilling 
down into the type of victory reveals still more differences 
between the two groups. The divide between appellate defenders 
and court-appointed attorneys is greatest on sentencing issues. 
Appellate defenders obtained favorable action on a sentencing 
issue in 9.49 percent of all their appeals, while for court-
appointed attorneys that number was just 3.87 percent. The 
appellate defenders’ performance on sentencing exceeded 
retained counsel as well, with privately retained attorneys 
obtaining a favorable sentencing outcome in 7.32 percent of 
appeals. 
The difference among type of counsel for other subtypes of 
favorable action is more limited. For “acquitted” outcomes, in 
which at least one conviction was eliminated with prejudice, all 
three groups were fairly similar: 3.68 percent for the appellate 
defenders, 2.38 percent for court-appointed attorneys, and 2.44 
percent for privately retained counsel. For new trials, appellate 
defenders outperformed court-appointed attorneys (6.20 percent 
for the appellate defenders and 3.57 percent for court-appointed 
attorneys), and private counsel outperformed both groups by a 
wide margin, obtaining a new trial in 12.19 percent of their 
appeals. 
Wasserman suggested in his book that “[s]entence appeals 
may depend on the attorneys’ skill in making an apparently 
recalcitrant and dangerous offender appear sinned against as 
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well as sinning.”161 This would be consistent with the appellate 
defenders, who specialize in criminal-appellate law, 
outperforming more generalist court-appointed and privately 
retained lawyers on sentencing issues. But Wasserman’s logic is 
harder to follow in Iowa, which has an indeterminate sentencing 
scheme and highly deferential sentencing review for sentences 
within statutory limits.162 Although I have no empirical data to 
prove it, I suspect that many more sentencing appeals 
(particularly successful appeals that result in a re-sentencing) 
turn on procedural problems, like failing to state reasons for a 
sentence,163 failing to notify a defendant of his rights under the 
rules of criminal procedure,164 or imposing an improper fine or 
surcharge.165 In those cases, the appellate defenders likely have 
an issue-spotting advantage, given the complexities of Iowa’s 
sentencing code and the frequency with which certain issues 
recur. 
D. The Appellate Defenders and Court-Appointed Attorneys 
Represented Similar Percentages of Felons and Misdemeanants 
in 2012–2013. 
As mentioned in Part II.B.1.a, the assignment of cases 
between the AD’s Office and court-appointed attorneys is not 
 161. Id. at 99. 
 162. See IOWA CODE § 902.3 (2013) (providing for indeterminate sentencing for all 
felonies other than Class A felonies), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/ 
2013/902.pdf; IOWA CODE § 903.1(2) (2013) (providing that all aggravated misdemeanants 
sentenced to a term of incarceration greater than one year shall serve indeterminate 
sentences), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/2013/903.pdf; State v. 
Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002) (“[T]he decision of the district court to impose 
a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its 
favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of 
inappropriate matters.”). 
 163. See, e.g., State v. Argueta-Rivas, No. 11-1135, 2012 WL 837260, at *2 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Mar. 4, 2012) (remanding for re-sentencing because the reasons for sentencing were 
“not apparent”). 
 164. See, e.g., State v. McLachlan, No. 12-2040, 2013 WL 5498059, at *4 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Oct. 2, 2013) (remanding for re-sentencing because the district court did not grant a 
defendant the right to allocution). 
 165. See, e.g., State v. Pike, No. 13-0051, 2013 WL 5951192, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 
6, 2013) (remanding for re-sentencing to correct imposition of improper fine); State v. 
Robinson, 841 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (remanding for re-sentencing to 
correct imposition of unauthorized domestic-violence surcharge). 
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purely random. This matters because it could potentially affect 
my data—if the AD can screen out “loser” cases and keep 
“winners,” this would skew the AD’s rate of favorable 
outcomes. I tentatively rule out this confounding variable for 
two reasons. First, even if we accept the premise that a screening 
attorney can predict outcomes based on a cursory review of the 
record, I am skeptical that can be done at the stage when 
screening decisions are made: pre-briefing and before any 
detailed review of the record.166 Without any transcripts or a 
complete record, it seems virtually impossible for anyone to 
“game the system” and determine which cases present a viable 
issue with a likelihood of success versus which cases are likely 
to be summarily affirmed. This militates against the likelihood 
that the chief appellate defender has put his thumb on the scale 
or used some sort of selection bias to skew his office’s numbers. 
That said, the second reason I rule out selection bias is 
because my data don’t reflect even the limited selection biases 
described by the chief appellate defender. The chief appellate 
defender told me that the non-random component focused on 
offense severity—the AD only withdrew from Class A felonies 
when it could not undertake representation due to a conflict, 
they “try to keep the more serious cases,” and the office tries to 
“generally withdraw from the less serious cases—driving 
offenses, OWI, simple possession.”167 The data displayed in the 
graph on the following page, looking at the whole population of 
criminal appeals in the study, do not support this description of 
the office’s practices. 
 166. The AD actually withdraws before filing a combined certificate, which means that 
there are no transcripts to review at the point of screening because none have been prepared 
yet. See IOWA R. APP. P. 6.804 (2013) (describing form and use of combined certificate), 
available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf; 
see also, e.g., State v. Lange Online Docket, https://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us/ESAWeb 
App/AIndexFrm (application to withdraw on 06/01/2012, court-appointed attorneys 
appointed on 06/11/2012 and 07/16/2012, combined certificate filed 07/26/2012). 
 167. Attachment to Swaim December Email, supra note 28. 
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the level of defaults175 and the level of stricken filings176 are 
relatively consistent. So too for the very similar rates at which 
further review was sought177 and granted.178 In short, whether 
you limit the study to direct appeals or consider both direct 
appeals and postconviction appeals, the findings outlined above 
hold up: The appellate defenders generally perform better than 
court-appointed attorneys.179
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Numbers and graphs never tell the whole story. Every 
study, no matter how empirical or objective its source data, has 
limitations. As described below, the study here is limited—most 
notably in terms of time-period, jurisdiction, and potential 
 175. On direct appeal, the AD was defaulted in 0.21 percent of appeals, compared to 
0.19 percent in the combined sample. Compare Table 27: Defaults (Direct Appeals), infra
p. 252, with Table 5: Defaults, infra p. 244. Court-appointed attorneys were defaulted 
21.88 percent of the time in the direct-appeal sample and 22.62 percent in the combined 
sample. See id.
 176. On direct appeal, AD filings were stricken in 0.64 percent of appeals, compared to 
0.58 percent of appeals in the combined sample. Compare Table 28: Stricken Filings 
(Direct Appeals), infra p. 252, with Table 6: Stricken Filings, infra p. 244. Court-appointed 
attorneys’ filings were stricken 31.77 percent of the time on direct appeal, compared to 
29.75 percent of the time in the combined sample. See id.
 177. The AD sought further review 79.03 percent of the time on direct appeal, and 79.57 
percent of the time in the combined sample. Compare Table 29: Further Review Sought 
Following Loss (Direct Appeals), infra p. 253, with Table 7: Further Review Sought 
Following Loss, infra p. 245. Court-appointed attorneys sought further review in 38.92 
percent of direct appeals, compared to 44.88 percent in the combined sample. See id. 
 178. The AD’s further-review applications were granted 4.84 percent of the time on 
direct appeal, compared to 4.33 percent of the time in the combined sample. Compare
Table 30: Further Review Obtained Following Loss (Direct Appeals), infra p. 253, with
Table 8: Further Review Obtained Following Loss, infra p. 245. Court-appointed attorneys 
did not obtain further review in either sample. See id.
 179. Some research, presented as an aside in the NCSC study of five state appellate 
courts, indicates that “winning big” occurs more frequently in appeals of the least severe 
offenses, while the most severe offenses result in “winning little.” REVERSIBLE ERROR,
supra note 4, at 6 (indicating, however, that the relationships between sentence length and 
outcome on appeal are statistically weak). If the appellate defender successfully screened 
out low-severity cases and kept high-severity cases, one would then expect the appellate 
defender to have more “little” wins and court-appointed attorneys to have more “big” wins. 
The study reveals that, in Iowa, appellate defenders have far more “little” wins (around 
three times as many re-sentencing outcomes) and somewhat more “big” wins (between 1.5 
and twice as many acquittals and new trials) than do court-appointed attorneys. See Table 
2: Acquitted, infra p. 242; Table 3: New Trial, infra p. 242; Table 4: Re-Sentenced, infra p. 
243.
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confounding variables. With those limitations in mind, the data 
are still compelling and the suggestion that some indigent 
defendants get better lawyers than others should worry observers 
of the criminal justice system. So what can be done about it? I 
make two proposals below: expanding the AD’s office and 
reforming certain aspects of the court-appointed-attorney 
system. I conclude by addressing the lingering question of 
whether the data showing comparatively weak performance by 
court-appointed attorneys amounts to ineffective assistance. 
A. Limitations on the Study. 
Before looking at the data for its relevance to public policy 
and understanding the criminal justice system, it is important to 
acknowledge the limitations of this study and the data it 
contains.
First, the study in this article captures a narrow snapshot in 
time: calendar years 2012 and 2013. It would be a mistake to 
assume that the data collected here necessarily mirror the 
numbers for other years. Courts change, as do criminal statutes, 
constitutional issues, and the particular attorneys involved. One 
area that jumps out as a potential source of variance is change in 
an appellate court: Over the course of 2012–2013, one judge 
retired180 and the Court of Appeals saw three different chief 
judges discharge the duties of that office.181 There is little doubt 
 180. When Chief Judge Larry Eisenhauer retired in 2013, Iowa’s governor appointed 
Judge Christopher M. McDonald to the Court of Appeals. See Office of the Governor of 
Iowa, News Release: Branstad Appoints Christopher L. McDonald to the Iowa Court of 
Appeals, Sept. 19, 2013, available at https://governor.iowa.gov/2013/09/branstad-appoints-
christopher-l-mcdonald-to-the-iowa-court-of-appeals/. 
 181. Following Chief Judge Rosemary Sackett’s retirement, the Court of Appeals 
elected Judge Larry Eisenhauer as chief judge. See Iowa Judicial Branch, News Release: 
Iowa Court of Appeals Elects Eisenhauer as Chief Judge, Feb. 10, 2012, available at http: 
//www.iowacourts.gov/For_the_Media/news_releases/NewsItem508/index.asp. Following 
Chief Judge Eisenhauer’s retirement in 2013, Judge David Danilson was elected chief 
judge. See Iowa Judicial Branch, News Release: Iowa Court of Appeals Elects Danilson as 
Chief Judge, Dec. 12, 2013, available at http://www.iowacourts.gov/For_the_Media/news_ 
releases/NewsItem15/index.asp (Dec. 12, 2013). During the period between the retirements 
and election of a new chief judge, Judge Gayle Nelson Vogel served as acting chief judge. 
Cf. IOWA CT. R. 21.1 (providing procedures for selecting acting chief justice in the absence 
of the chief justice of the Iowa supreme court), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/ 
docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/10-29-2015.21.pdf. 
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that different judges come to different decisions, and this change 
in membership may have impacted the data. 
Second, it is possible that a variable not tracked by this 
study bears more strongly on appellate outcomes than the type 
of appellate lawyer. For example, the issues raised—regardless 
of whether they are raised by the appellate defenders or court-
appointed attorneys—might drive outcomes. But this study did 
not track the issues raised on appeal, largely because briefs182
that pre-date e-filing are difficult for the public to access 
(limiting the ability to replicate this study) and because 
qualitatively assessing the issues raised is more subjective than 
quantitatively assessing the type of counsel assigned to an 
appeal. Put simply, tracking issues would have required the kind 
of subjectivity that I strove to avoid when compiling the data for 
this piece. In addition to the issues raised on appeal, other 
potential variables affecting outcomes might have been the 
composition of Court of Appeals panels,183 whether error was 
preserved by trial counsel,184 or whether the case involved a 
guilty plea or trial.185 The aim of my study was not to conduct a 
regression to reject hypotheses of potential variables behind 
appellate outcomes—instead, I aimed to paint a picture of the 
differences between types of counsel in criminal appeals. I hope 
 182. Opinions alone are not sufficient to track raised issues because some cases are 
affirmed without opinion or by memorandum opinion. See IOWA CT. R. 21.26, available at
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRulesChapter/10-29-2015.21.pdf; IOWA R.
APP. P. 6.1203 (2013), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/CourtRules 
Chapter/06-30-2014.6.pdf.
 183. There appears to be high variability among judges. Although my dataset tracked 
only the opinion author—and not the participating judges—in each opinion, the rates of 
granting a defendant favorable action on appeal ranged from a high of 22.22 percent (Judge 
Vaitheswaran) to a low of 7.84 percent (Judge Vogel). 
 184. Iowa, unlike states that recognize “plain error,” has a longstanding tradition of 
strictly enforcing the rules of error preservation. See State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324, 
325 (Iowa 1999) (“We do not subscribe to the plain error rule in Iowa, have been persistent 
and resolute in rejecting it, and are not at all inclined to yield on the point.”); Danforth, 
Davis & Co. v. Carter, 1 Iowa 546, 552–53 (1855) (clearly stating the requirement of 
“specifically stated” objections to preserve error, and noting that the error-preservation 
rules are “eminently just and reasonable”). 
 185. In Iowa, a guilty plea waives all challenges to a conviction that are not intrinsic to 
the plea—so only claims that bear on the decision to plead, like whether the plea is 
knowing and voluntary, remain viable. See, e.g., State v. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d 395, 398 
(Iowa 2000); State v. Culbert, 188 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Iowa 1971). 
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to have done that and I would remind readers not to take this 
study for more than it is. 
Third, the data gathered here may not necessarily be ripe 
for extrapolation to other jurisdictions. The method of assigning 
cases between appellate defenders and court-appointed attorneys 
is not entirely clear in Iowa—I concede that assignment is not 
purely random, but it’s hard to reconcile the chief appellate 
defender’s explanation with the data.186 Other states have their 
own methodology for assigning cases and the traits of appellate 
defenders and court-appointed attorneys may also differ 
significantly from the picture painted in Part IV.B. These 
differences would likely affect the four metrics used to rate 
effectiveness if the study was transplanted to another 
jurisdiction. 
Keeping in mind the limitations discussed above, the 
narrative that emerges from the data collected in this study is 
still fairly straightforward: Appellate defenders, on most 
measures, perform better than court-appointed attorneys and 
roughly as well as privately retained counsel. But what does this 
mean for Iowa’s legal community and the development of public 
policy? 
B. Policymakers Should Expand 
the Iowa Appellate Defender’s Office. 
The most straightforward take-away from these data is that 
it makes sense to hire more appellate defenders and increase the 
proportion of defendants represented by the AD’s Office rather 
than court-appointed attorneys. I would not be the first writer to 
suggest expanding public-defender offices.187 Notably, the State 
 186. See supra Part V.D. 
 187. See, e.g., Dru Stevenson, Monopsony Problems with Court-Appointed Counsel, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 2273, 2293 (2014) (noting that a public-defender system “has efficiency 
advantages in terms of economies of scale” and that public defenders “tend to have more 
public-service motivation and higher levels of relevant skills, compared to their 
counterparts on lists of court-appointed independent contractors”); Texas Fair Defense 
Project, Benefits of a Public Defender Office 1 (Sept. 2009) (arguing that a public-defender 
office will provide better representation, and do it more cost-effectively, than the existing 
court-appointment system), available at http://www.texasfairdefenseproject.org/pdf/harris 
_county_pd_white_paper.pdf; Ronald W. Schneider, Jr., Comment, A Measure of Our 
Justice System: A Look at Maine’s Indigent Criminal Defense Delivery System, 48 ME. L.
REV. 335, 396–98 (1996) (asserting that a public-defender system would provide better 
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Public Defender’s data show that, at least for combined trial- 
and appellate-level costs, public defenders are significantly 
cheaper on a per-case basis.188 If my data show that appellate 
defenders achieve better outcomes, and the State Public 
Defender’s data show that they do so more cost-effectively, it is 
difficult to imagine a sound rebuttal to expanding the appellate 
defender’s staff.189
C. Reforming the Existing Court-Appointed Attorney System. 
Even if Iowa does not expand the ranks of its appellate 
defenders, the State Public Defender can take action to ensure 
that contract attorneys more closely approximate appellate 
defenders—at least in terms of training and experience. The 
SPD promulgated new rules (effective January 1, 2015) that 
impose minimum qualifications on future court-appointed 
attorneys.190 To represent a criminal defendant on direct appeal 
or a postconviction appeal, the new rules require participation in 
a “basic criminal appeals training” put on by the SPD Office, 
unless the attorney has already handled a criminal appeal,191 as 
well as three hours of CLE courses related to criminal law each 
year in which the attorney handles criminal appeals.192 While 
these rules might be a good start, the data here suggest they are 
representation than the existing court-appointment system). While not the first writer to 
make this suggestion, I may well be the first prosecutor to do so. 
 188. See Office of the State Public Defender, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Presentation 3–4  
(comparing case-costs, highlighting “savings” from expanding the number of public 
defenders, and including a  table displaying relevant data captioned “Savings to Indigent 
Defense Fund from FY11 Expansion”), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ 
publications/SD/2014/24872/24872.pdf. 
 189. Even following a massive expansion of the appellate defender corps, court-
appointed attorneys would likely still be desirable for conflicts cases. However, at least in 
theory, a secondary conflicts office could be established, and 100 percent of Iowa’s 
criminal defendants could be represented by appellate defenders from either the home 
office or the conflicts office. This is part of the rationale for the State Public Defender’s 
Special Defense Unit, which handles certain conflicts cases statewide, as well as 
representing indigents facing civil commitment as sexually violent predators. 
 190. See generally IOWA ADMIN. CODE R.493-11.3 (Jan. 7, 2015), available at https:// 
www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/iac/agency/01-07-2015.493.pdf.
 191. IOWA ADMIN. CODE. R. 493-11.3(2)(a), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/ 
docs/iac/agency/01-07-2015.493.pdf. 
 192. IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 493-11.3(2)(b), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/ 
docs/iac/agency/01-07-2015.493.pdf. 
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not enough. To start with, exempting attorneys who have 
previously completed only one criminal appeal will do little to 
remedy the repeated and persistent failure of court-appointed 
attorneys to comply with the rules of appellate procedure in 
filings before the appellate courts. All of the attorneys included 
in this study would be exempt from the 2015 administrative rule, 
yet court-appointed attorneys materially and substantially failed 
to comply with the rules of appellate procedure in about one 
quarter of cases193—often repeatedly and in spite of monetary 
fines issued by the Supreme Court. These attorneys require 
remedial training, if not ongoing monitoring by experienced 
appellate defense counsel. 
Developing and providing a support network for court-
appointed attorneys might also improve effectiveness. Public 
defenders, including the appellate defenders, work in multi-
attorney offices with colleagues they can collaborate with, 
bounce ideas off of, and obtain assistance from during briefing 
and preparation for oral arguments. In contrast, at least one 
study has found that the vast majority of court-appointed 
attorneys are solo practitioners, and even those in a group 
practice work in relatively small firms of less than five 
lawyers.194 Building on existing infrastructure, like web 
forums,195 can help mitigate some of this difference in office 
environments. So can developing additional support tools, like a 
brief bank or an appellate-defense-specific practice guide. But 
providing true support for a solo-practice contract attorney will 
be difficult. Court-appointed attorneys are spread across Iowa’s 
ninety-nine counties and the lack of mentoring relationships, 
especially in rural counties, has been noted by the Iowa Bar.196
 193. Specifically, court-appointed attorneys were defaulted in 22.62 percent of cases and 
at least one of their filings was stricken in 29.76 percent of cases. 
 194. Rachel Brooks, Job Satisfaction Among Court-Appointed Attorneys 45–46 (Aug. 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://digital.library.txstate.edu/bitstream/ 
handle/10877/4803/RBrooks%20Thesis%20may%2024%202012.pdf?sequence=1 (looking 
at court-appointed attorneys in a Texas county). 
 195. See Office of the State Public Defender, SPD-Indigent Defense Discussion Forum,
available at https://spd.iowa.gov/defense-resources/spd-indigent-defense-discussion-forum 
(describing the forum as “a meeting place that provides indigent defense attorneys 
discussion forums, member profiles, file storage and more”). 
 196. Jennifer Zwagerman, Needed: A Mentor Program for Young Lawyers, IOWA 
LAWYER 8 (Dec. 2014) (noting a need for a mentoring program, particularly now, when 
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Iowa should pay attention to the approach taken by some 
other states, where institutional defenders review and provide 
input to the work product of court-appointed lawyers. For 
example, California’s system provides a network of staff 
defenders who provide support to court-appointed attorneys, 
including consultation, pre-filing review of briefs, and routine 
evaluations of appointed-counsel work product.197 Adopting a 
similar approach in Iowa would allow the expertise of the 
appellate defenders to inform the work of court-appointed 
attorneys and provide a mechanism for routinely monitoring and 
evaluating brief quality without eliminating court-appointed 
attorneys altogether. 
Given the comparatively poor performance by court-
appointed attorneys as compared to both the appellate defenders 
and privately retained lawyers, some might suggest increasing 
pay for court-appointed attorneys. The data make me somewhat 
skeptical that this would improve the quality of representation. 
Retained counsel, at least in theory, are paid at a market rate that 
likely exceeds the government salaries of the appellate 
defenders.198 Yet retained counsel’s performance on the 
measures explored in this study were mixed: They only 
marginally outperformed the appellate defenders in outcomes 
and obtaining further review, and the appellate defenders 
outperformed retained counsel on procedural defects and 
seeking further review. One expects that, if increased pay 
fewer young attorneys set foot in the physical courthouse due to e-filing), available at 
http://digital.turn-page.com/i/426134. 
 197. See, e.g., APPELLATE DEFENDERS, INC., CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE 
PRACTICE MANUAL, 5–7, 45–57 (2014) (addressing, respectively, “assisted cases” and 
“classification and matching of cases and attorneys”), available at http://www.adi-sandiego 
.com/panel/manual/California_Appellate_Practice_Manual.pdf.   
 198. The mean salary among appellate defenders in 2012 was $93,834.00. See Iowa 
Legislature, State Employee Salary Book, https://www.legis.iowa.gov/publications/fiscal/ 
salaryBook (search “2015” and “Inspections and Appeals, Dept of” in drop-down menus 
on main page, then search “appellate defender” in chart to see salary range). According to a 
2011 survey, 50.2 percent of Iowa lawyers had income exceeding $100,001.00 in 2010, 
and another 10.6 percent of Iowa lawyers earned between $80,001.00 and $100,000.00. 
IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, 2011 ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LEGAL PRACTICE IN IOWA
10, available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iowabar.org/resource/resmgr/Files/2011_ 
Economic_Survey.pdf. This means that more than a slight majority of Iowa lawyers earns 
more than the average appellate defender, and that 30.8 percent of Iowa lawyers make 
more than $150,000, substantially outpacing even the chief appellate defender’s salary of 
around $131,000.00. 
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directly correlated with increased performance, retained counsel 
would outperform government-salaried appellate defenders on 
relevant measures—yet the data do not support that conclusion. 
Increasing compensation, at least without making other changes, 
is not a change naturally suggested by the data in this study.199
Another area for potential reform that I ruled out was the 
possibility of caps or restrictions on assigning appointed counsel 
additional criminal cases.200 A 2014 investigation by the Iowa 
Auditor of State found that eleven court-appointed attorneys had 
billed more than twelve hours per day on multiple occasions.201
The particulars of the investigation are damning: On more than 
fifty days, court-appointed attorneys claimed to work more than 
twenty-four hours; on another ninety days, they claimed to work 
more than twenty hours; and on another 390 days, more than 
fifteen hours.202 However, the potential impact of imposing a 
cap is not strongly supported by the appellate-outcome data 
here. Only two court-appointed attorneys had more than ten 
cases in the 2012–2013 sample, and even ten cases for a two-
year period falls far short of the seventy or eighty cases that the 
chief appellate defender estimated each full-time appellate 
defender would handle during the same period. 
D. Disparity in Outcomes as Ineffective Assistance? 
As a prosecutor, I would be remiss if I failed to address the 
legal-issue elephant in the room, given my data that show 
defendants represented by appellate defenders do better on 
appeal. Can a criminal defendant who was represented by court-
appointed attorneys, and whose conviction is affirmed on 
 199. Other data also support the notion that changes in compensation—or at least 
compensation structures—do not materially affect the time spent on criminal trials or 
appeals. See Richard E. Priehs, Appointed Counsel for Indigent Criminal Appellants: Does 
Compensation Influence Effort? 21 JUST. SYS. J. 57, 67 (1999). 
 200. A student comment champions the approach taken by Washington’s Supreme Court 
that requires indigent counsel to comply with caseload limitations. See generally Andrea 
Woods, Comment, The Undersigned Attorney Hereby Certifies: Ensuring Reasonable 
Caseloads for Washington Defenders and Clients, 87 WASH. L. REV. 217 (2014). 
 201. Office of Auditor of State, State of Iowa, News Release, Sept. 4, 2014, at 1, 
available at http://auditor.iowa.gov/reports/1160-4270-0E01.pdf.
 202. Id. at 1–2. The report does not identify whether any of the claims were for appellate 
work and the specifics of those prosecutions are not yet matters of public record. 
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appeal, claim ineffective assistance because he was not 
appointed a “better” lawyer in the form of an appellate 
defender? I think not. For one thing, it’s virtually impossible to 
prove that a particular court-appointed attorney was less 
effective than a hypothetical appellate defender, even if the data 
show that—over time and on average—the appellate defenders 
achieve better outcomes. For another, appellate claims of 
ineffective assistance require proof of a reasonable probability 
of a different outcome.203 Putting a number on that term—
“reasonable probability”—is hard. The courts have said that it 
means something less than fifty percent,204 and I would argue 
that it probably also means something more than the 9.56 
percent overall difference in rates of favorable outcome.205
Lastly, appellate counsel’s decisions about which issues to raise 
are virtually immune to second-guessing, given the tactical 
nature of those decisions.206 No one disputes that an ideal 
indigent-defense system would afford the same outcomes to 
defendants regardless of the type of lawyer they receive. But, at 
best, the data reported here suggest the desirability of some 
institutional changes—changes in training for court-appointed
attorneys or in the availability of appellate defenders. This study 
does not create an escape-hatch for convicted criminals who 
happened to receive counsel from the court-appointed list. 
 203. See, e.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 471–72 (2000) (explaining that 
“[b]ecause the defendant in such cases must show that counsel’s deficient performance 
actually deprived him of an appeal, . . . he must demonstrate that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he 
would have timely appealed,” and that “[t]he question whether a defendant has made the 
requisite showing will turn on the facts of the particular case”). 
 204. E.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (“[W]e believe that a 
defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the 
outcome in the case.”). 
 205. The 9.56 percent difference is calculated based on 19.38 percent favorable 
outcomes for appellate defenders versus 9.82 percent for court-appointed attorneys. See 
Table 1: Favorable Action, infra p. 242. The difference is even smaller when court-
appointed attorneys’ performance is compared to the average for all 2012–2013 appeals 
(excluding pro se appeals): The mean rate of favorable action was 16.41 percent, which 
amounts to a 6.59 percent difference. See id.
 206. See Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Iowa 1998) (“Selecting assignments to 
assert as grounds for reversal is a professional judgment call [Iowa courts] are reluctant to 
second-guess.”); Cuevas v. State, 415 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Iowa 1987) (noting “[h]ighly 
competent appellate lawyers generally assign only the strongest points and rely on them for 
reversal”).
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VII. CONCLUSION
If we are to continue having criminal appeals in Iowa,207
then the effectiveness of counsel should not vary based on the 
type of lawyer. The study contained in this article—even with its 
limitations—suggests that some indigent defendants get better 
lawyers than others, in the form of appellate defenders versus 
court-appointed attorneys. This is an untenable state of affairs. 
The exact mechanism for leveling the playing field between 
indigent-defense counsel is beyond the scope of this article. The 
data here note a problem, and the numbers alone cannot provide 
a solution. But at least this much is clear: If Iowa’s criminal 
justice system continues to have separate and distinct types of 
appellate counsel for indigent defendants, something has to give. 
The easiest solution is to hire more appellate defenders, 
thereby shifting a greater proportion of representation to that 
office. If this is not feasible for political or institutional reasons, 
significant reforms—like giving the appellate defenders 
oversight of court-appointed-attorney work product—are 
needed. The bottom line is that court-appointed attorneys must 
get better at their job and perform better on the metrics used in 
this study. They must improve their advocacy to win a more-
comparable numbers of cases, they must file papers with fewer 
technical and procedural problems, they must seek further 
review more often, and they must present more compelling cases 
in further-review applications to obtain Supreme Court review. 
The data here are not perfect, and of course I did not set out 
to mathematically evaluate every potential variable in criminal 
appeals. My goal here was to show, with some evidentiary 
support, the difference between types of appellate defense 
 207. “There is, of course, no constitutional right to an appeal.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 
745, 751 (1983); see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894) (noting that “review by an 
appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of 
which the accused is convicted, was not at common law, and is not now, a necessary 
element of due process of law”). A cynic familiar with Jones and McKane might propose 
asking the Iowa General Assembly to resolve any perceived disparities in attorneys’ 
effectiveness by abolishing statutory criminal appeals altogether. Not only would this 
affect my job security as an appellate prosecutor, at least one scholar has considered 
whether the modern Supreme Court would support abolishing the right to appeal. See
generally Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 503, 504 (1992). In any event, the abolition of statutory criminal appeals in 
Iowa seems highly unlikely in the near future. 
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counsel, and the different outcomes seen by their clients. The 
story told by the data is that appellate defenders outperform 
court-appointed attorneys on the metrics that matter. It’s time for 
Iowa policymakers to do something about that. 
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APPENDIX A: CODING RUBRIC
Docket Number 
The docket number for each case was initially recorded from 
the Iowa Judicial Branch website for each opinion day, then 
compared with the online docket records available through Iowa 
Courts Online. Where there was inconsistency between the 
published opinion and the docket, the docket controls.208
Criminal Appeal/Postconviction Relief 
The type of case was recorded based on the caption of the 
case. Cases captioned State v. Defendant were coded as criminal 
cases. Cases captioned Defendant v. State were coded as 
postconviction cases. Coding did not vary based on the presence 
of a cross-appeal, application for discretionary review, or 
petition for writ of certiorari; those cases were coded for the 
type of case in which they originated.209
County
The county was recorded based on the cover page of the 
slip opinion posted on the Judicial Branch website. 
 208. Compare State v. Sean Dana Scott, slip op. at 1, http://www.iowacourts.gov/about 
_the_courts/court_of_appeals/court_of_appeals_opinions/recent_opinions/20130515/3-373 
.pdf (listing Sup. Ct. No. 12-1531) with Iowa Courts Online, State v. Sean Dana Scott, Sup. 
Ct. No. 12-1561, available at https://www.iowacourts.state.ia.us/ESAWebApp/AppelSimp 
Frame.
 209. For example, State v. VanderLinden originated as a petition for writ of certiorari. 
The defendant filed the writ to challenge a district court judge’s change of mind on a 
motion for judgment of acquittal, setting aside of a verdict, and then reinstatement of the 
verdict. See State v. VanderLinden, 2013 WL 1453245 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013). The Supreme 
Court treated the writ as an application for discretionary review and transferred it to the 
Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Id. at *3. The case was coded as a criminal case. 
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Counsel Type 
Type of counsel was determined by reviewing both the slip 
opinions and the online docket for each case. In judicial 
opinions, both court-appointed and retained counsel are 
identified by their firm and/or city of residence. Employees of 
the appellate defender’s office are identified as such. Attorneys 
were coded as court-appointed if the docket shows that fees 
were waived due to indigency, if the district court entered an 
order appointing counsel, or if the clerk’s office labeled filings 
as “Ct App.” Cases were coded for retained counsel if the docket 
noted an appeal fee was paid. In the event of conflicting 
evidence as to the type of counsel, the latest evidence 
concerning counsel of record listed on the judicial opinion was 
used as the basis for coding. If no defense attorney appeared on 
behalf of the defendant at the time of the judicial opinion, the 
case was coded as “pro se.” 
AAG
The Assistant Attorney General whose name appeared on 
the brief in each case was coded as the AAG for that case. In the 
event one State attorney withdrew and was replaced by another, 
only the latest attorney was coded. 
Judge
The judge was coded based on who was listed as the author 
of the court’s opinion. 
Favorable/Unfavorable Outcome 
Unfavorable outcomes were coded to include all cases in 
which the judgment was either affirmed in whole (or 
conditionally affirmed) or the appeal was dismissed. All other 
outcomes were classified as favorable. 
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Type of Favorable Outcome 
Types of outcomes were broken into three categories, coded 
as follows— 
1. Acquitted 
Outcomes were coded as “acquitted” if one or more of the 
counts charged were vacated with jeopardy attached 
(meaning that the defendant cannot be retried on those 
particular charges). This includes any case in which the 
court ordered dismissal of some or all of a trial information 
or remanded for an order of dismissal. Also included are 
any cases in which a greater charge was vacated for 
judgment to be entered on a lesser charge. 
2. New trial 
Outcomes were coded as “new trial” any time the Court of 
Appeals ordered a new trial or “reversed and remanded” 
without specifying that a count was dismissed or that the 
district court should enter an acquittal. This included any 
case in which a guilty plea was found to lack a factual basis 
and cases in which an order of suppression was reversed 
and the Court of Appeals did not affirm based on harmless 
error.
3. Re-Sentenced 
Outcomes were coded as “re-sentenced” anytime the Court 
of Appeals remanded for a new sentencing hearing or 
modified a sentence. Any cases in which restitution or costs 
were remanded, re-calculated, or modified were also coded 
as “re-sentenced.” 
Procedural Defect/No Procedural Defect 
Cases were coded as having a procedural defect when they 
had any stricken filings, any defaults issued by the clerk’s office 
or a single-justice order, or both. 
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1. Stricken filings 
a. Cases were coded as having stricken filings if the 
comments for any single-justice order or deputy-clerk order 
listed defense filings as “struck” or “stricken,” or if orders 
compelled the filing of amended documents. Cases were 
also coded for having stricken filings if the deputy clerk 
issued a letter that compelled defense counsel to file 
amended documents or additional documents, such as a 
supplemental appendix. 
b. If filings made by other defense attorneys were stricken 
prior to the appearance of counsel of record (whose name 
appeared on the brief), the stricken filings were not 
counted. If pro se defendants’ filings were stricken, they 
were not attributed to counsel, but were attributed to pro se 
defendants in cases in which no defense attorney appeared 
as counsel of record. 
2. Defaults 
A case was coded as having a default if one was reflected 
in the online docketing system. If defaults were formally 
withdrawn by an order of a Supreme Court justice or a 
letter issued by the deputy clerk, they were not coded. 
Oral Argument 
Cases were coded for oral argument based on whether 
argument was actually held, as reflected on the online docket. 
Cases originally scheduled for argument but then removed from 
the oral-argument calendar were coded as not having oral 
argument. 
Further Review 
1. Whether defense counsel filed an application. 
In cases with an unfavorable outcome, each case was also 
coded for whether the defendant’s attorney filed an 
application for further review, as reflected in entries on the 
online docket. If a pro se defendant filed a further review, 
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 51 Side B      05/10/2016   12:12:25
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 51 Side B      05/10/2016   12:12:25
BULLERRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2016 1:02 PM 
240 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
the case was coded as defense counsel did not file. If 
counsel filed an untimely application, the case was coded 
as counsel did not file an application. 
2. Whether the application was granted. 
Each case that yielded an unfavorable outcome and in 
which an application was filed was coded based on whether 
the application was granted. 
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APPENDIX B: DOCKET ABBREVIATIONS
Parties 
T—Appellant
E/EE—Appellee
AD—Appellate Defender 
AG—Attorney General 
District Court Filings 
DCT—District Court 
PSI—Pre-Sentence Investigation Report 
Briefs and Appellate Filings 
APPL—Application
EXT—Extension 
CC—Combined Certificate 
PB—Proof Brief 
DP—Designation of Parts 
FB—Final Brief 
RB—Reply Brief 
FRB—Final Reply Brief 
X—Appendix
Appellate Comments
NFE—No Further Extensions 
EDMS—Electronic Data Management System (e-filing) 
CERT—Certified or Certificate 
INFO—Informational (e.g., copy of notice of appeal) 
CONF—Confidential
CT APP—Court-Appointed 
SUPP—Supplemental (e.g., appendix or brief) 
AM—Amended 
CA—Court of Appeals 
SC—Supreme Court 
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APPENDIX C: OUTCOMES 
(2012–2013, ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS)
Table 1: Favorable Action 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases with 
favorable action 
Total
cases 
Percentage with 
favorable action 
Appellate Defenders 100 516 19.38% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
33 336 09.82% 
Retained Counsel 27 123 21.95% 
Total (all counsel) 160 975 16.41% 
Table 2: Acquitted
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases with 
acquittal 
Total
cases 
Percentage with 
acquittal 
Appellate Defenders 19 516 03.68% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
8 336 02.38% 
Retained Counsel 3 123 02.44% 
Total (all counsel) 30 975 03.08% 
Table 3: New Trial
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases with 
new trial 
Total
cases 
Percentage with new 
trial
Appellate Defenders 32 516 06.20% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
12 336 03.57% 
Retained Counsel 15 123 12.20% 
Total (all counsel) 59 975 06.05% 
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Table 4: Re-Sentenced
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases with 
re-sentencing 
Total
cases 
Percentage with re-
sentencing 
Appellate Defenders 49 516 09.50% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
13 336 03.87% 
Retained Counsel 9 123 07.32% 
Total  (all counsel) 71 975 07.28% 
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APPENDIX D: PROCEDURAL DEFECTS
(2012–2013, ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS)
Table 5: Defaults
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases 
with defaults 
Total cases Percentage with 
defaults
Appellate Defenders 1 516 00.19% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
76 336 22.62% 
Retained Counsel 27 123 21.95% 
Total (all counsel) 104 975 10.67% 
Table 6: Stricken Filings
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases with 
stricken filings 
Total
cases 
Percentage with 
stricken filings 
Appellate Defenders 3 516 00.58% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
100 336 29.76% 
Retained Counsel 27 123 21.95% 
Total (all counsel) 130 975 13.33% 
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APPENDIX E: FURTHER REVIEWS 
(2012–2013, ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS)
Table 7: Further Review Sought Following Loss210
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases 
further review 
sought 
Number of 
cases lost 
Percentage further 
review sought 
Appellate Defenders 331 416 79.57% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
136 303 44.88% 
Retained Counsel 54 96 56.25% 
Total (all counsel) 521 815 63.93% 
Table 8: Further Review Obtained Following Loss211
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases 
further review 
obtained
Number of 
cases lost 
Percentage further 
review obtained (of all 
cases) 
Appellate Defenders 18 416 4.33% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
0 303 0.00% 
Retained Counsel 5 96 5.21% 
Total (all counsel) 23 815 2.82% 
Table 9: Proportion of Further-Review Applications Granted  
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases 
further review 
obtained
Number of 
applications
Percentage  applications 
granted
Appellate Defenders 18 331 05.44% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
0 136 00.00% 
Retained Counsel 5 54 09.26% 
Total (all counsel) 23 521 04.41% 
 210. This table tracks only further-review applications following a complete loss (total 
affirmance) at the Court of Appeals. 
 211. This table tracks the rate at which further-review applications were granted out of 
all losses for each type of counsel, rather than out of the number of applications filed by 
each type of counsel. 
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APPENDIX F: OFFENSE SEVERITY
(2012–2013, ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS)
Table 10: Offense Severity: Felony Appeals
Type of  
Counsel
Number of felony 
appeals
Percentage of appeals handled 
Appellate Defenders 388 75.19% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 255 75.89% 
Retained Counsel 57 46.34% 
Total (all counsel) 700 71.79% 
Table 11: Offense Severity: Class A Felonies 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of Class-A-
felony appeals 
Percentage of Class-A-felony 
appeals handled  
Appellate Defenders 30 05.81% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 36 10.71% 
Retained Counsel 3 02.44% 
Total (all counsel) 69 07.08% 
Table 12: Offense Severity: Class B Felonies 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of Class-B-
felony appeals 
Percentage of Class-B-felony 
appeals handled  
Appellate Defenders 102 19.77% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 93 27.68% 
Retained Counsel 14 11.38% 
Total (all counsel) 69 21.44% 
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Table 13: Offense Severity: Class C Felonies 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of Class-C-
felony appeals 
Percentage of Class-C-felony 
appeals handled 
Appellate Defenders 130 25.19% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 58 17.26% 
Retained Counsel 18 14.63% 
Total (all counsel) 69 21.13% 
Table 14: Offense Severity: Class D Felonies 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of Class-D-
felony appeals 
Percentage handled by each 
type
Appellate Defenders 126 24.42% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 68 20.24% 
Retained Counsel 22 17.89% 
Total (all counsel) 216 22.15% 
Table 15: Offense Severity: Misdemeanor Appeals 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of misdemeanor 
appeals
Percentage handled by each 
type
Appellate Defenders 128 24.81% 
Court-Appointed
Attorneys
81 24.11% 
Retained Counsel 66 53.66% 
Total (all counsel) 700 28.21% 
Table 16: Offense Severity: Aggravated Misdemeanors 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of aggravated–
misdemeanor appeals 
Percentage handled by each 
type
Appellate Defenders 72 13.95% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 40 11.90% 
Retained Counsel 30 24.39% 
Total (all counsel) 69 14.56% 
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Table 17: Offense Severity: Serious Misdemeanors 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of serious–
misdemeanor appeals 
Percentage handled by each 
type
Appellate Defenders 52 10.08% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 41 12.20% 
Retained Counsel 31 25.20% 
Total (all counsel) 124 12.72% 
Table 18: Offense Severity: Simple Misdemeanors 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of Simple–
Misd. appeals 
Percentage handled by each 
type
Appellate Defenders 4 00.78% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 0 00.00% 
Retained Counsel 5 04.07% 
Total (all counsel types) 9 00.92% 
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APPENDIX G: MISCELLANEOUS STATISTICS
(2012–2013, ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS)
Table 19: Type of Counsel Overall (Pro Se Excluded)212
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases  Percentage of all cases in 
sample
Appellate Defenders 516 52.92% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 336 34.46% 
Retained Counsel 123 12.62% 
Total (all counsel) 975
Table 20: Type of Counsel Overall (Pro Se Included) 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases  Percentage of cases  
Appellate Defenders 516 52.28% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 336 34.04% 
Retained Counsel 123 12.46% 
Pro Se Defendants 12 01.22% 
Total (all counsel) 987
Table 21: Oral Argument 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases 
with oral argument 
Percentage of cases with 
oral argument/all criminal 
appeals
Appellate Defenders 34 06.59% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 35 10.42% 
Retained Counsel 21 17.07% 
Total (all counsel) 90 9.23% 
 212.  No statistics calculated for this article include pro se appeals, unless explicitly 
noted otherwise. All statistics are calculated based on the 975-case figure calculated in 
Table 19: Type of Counsel Overall (Pro Se Excluded). 
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Table 22: Comparison of Iowa and NCSC Data 
TypeȱofȱOutcomeȱ IowaȱOverallȱ
Statisticsȱ
NCSCȱOverallȱStatisticsȱ
Affirmedȱ 83.59%ȱ 79.40%ȱ
Acquittalȱ 03.08%ȱ 01.90%ȱ
Newȱtrialȱ 06.05%ȱ 06.60%ȱ
ReȬsentencingȱ 09.33%ȱ 07.30%ȱ
Otherȱ N/A213ȱ 04.80%ȱ
Table 23: State/Attorney General As Litigant 
Type of  
Counsel
Frequency of event Rate of event 
Favorable Action on 
Defendants’ Appeals 
815 83.59% 
Favorable Action on State’s 
Appeal
14 77.78% 
Sought Further Review 
Following Loss in 
Defendants’ Appeal 
20 12.50% 
Obtained Further Review 
Following Loss in 
Defendants’ Appeals 
7 35.00% 
 213.  As discussed in note 63, supra, the tabulation of results in this study differs slightly 
from the tabulation of results in the NCSC report. The 4.8 percent “other” result does not 
directly correspond to any categorization used in this study. 
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Table 24: Retained Cases (2012–2013) 
Type of  
Counsel
Frequency of 
event
Rate of event out of total 
retained cases 
Defendants’ appeals 17 80.95% 
State’s appeals (and cert. 
actions) 
4 19.05% 
Favorable action (for defendant) 
in defendants’ appeals 
9 52.94% 
Favorable action (for State) in 
State’s appeals 
7 25.00% 
Retained cases filed by appellate 
defenders
7 41.18% 
Retained cases filed by court-
apptd. attorneys  
6 35.29% 
Retained cases filed by retained 
counsel  
4 25.53% 
Table 25: Outcomes of Cases Granted Further Review (2012–2013)
Event Frequency of 
event
Rate of event 
Favorable Action (Ct. App. 
vacated, district court reversed) 
12 52.17% 
No favorable action (Ct. App. 
aff’d, district court aff’d) 
9 39.13% 
Further-review app. mooted 
due to defendant’s death 
2 08.70% 
Total applications granted 23
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APPENDIX H: STATISTICS FOR DIRECT APPEALS
(2012–2013, EXCLUDING POSTCONVICTION APPEALS)
Table 26: Favorable Action (Direct Appeals) 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases 
with favorable 
action
Number of 
Direct Appeals 
Percentage of cases 
with favorable 
action
Appellate Defenders 99 471 21.02% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
25 192 13.02% 
Retained Counsel 26 105 24.76% 
Total (all counsel) 150 768 19.53% 
Table 27: Defaults (Direct Appeals) 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases 
with defaults 
Number of Direct 
Appeals 
Percentage of cases 
with defaults 
Appellate Defenders 1 471 00.21% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
42 192 21.88% 
Retained Counsel 20 105 19.05% 
Total (all counsel) 43 768 05.60% 
Table 28: Stricken Filings (Direct Appeals) 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases 
with stricken 
filings
Number of Direct 
Appeals 
Percentage of cases 
with stricken filings 
Appellate Defenders 3 471 00.64% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
61 192 31.77% 
Retained Counsel 24 105 22.86% 
Total (all counsel) 64 768 08.33% 
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Table 29: Further Review Sought Following Loss (Direct Appeals)214
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases 
further review 
sought 
Number of Direct 
Appeals 
Percentage of cases 
further review 
sought 
Appellate Defenders 294 372 79.03% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
65 167 38.92% 
Retained Counsel 45 79 56.96% 
Total
(all counsel types) 
404 618 65.37% 
Table 30: Further Review Obtained Following Loss (Direct Appeals)215
Type of  
Counsel
Number of cases 
further review 
obtained
Number of Direct 
Appeals 
Percentage of 
further review 
obtained (out of all 
losses) 
Appellate Defenders 18 372 04.84% 
Court-Appointed 
Attorneys
0 167 00.00% 
Retained Counsel 4 79 05.06% 
Total
(all counsel types) 
22 618 03.56% 
 214. This table tracks only further-review applications following a complete loss (total 
affirmance) at the Court of Appeals. 
 215. This table tracks the rate at which further-review applications were granted out of 
all losses for each type of counsel, rather than out of the number of applications filed by 
each type of counsel. 
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Table 31: Offense Severity: Felony Appeals (Direct Appeals)
Type of  
Counsel
Number of felony 
appeals
Percentage of felony appeals 
handled by each type 
Appellate Defenders 350 74.31% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 116 60.42% 
Retained Counsel 47 44.76% 
Total (all counsel) 513 66.80% 
Table 32: Offense Severity: Class A Felonies (Direct Appeals)
Type of  
Counsel
Number of Class-A-
felony appeals 
Percentage of Class-A-felony 
appeals handled by each type 
Appellate Defenders 24 05.10% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 5 02.60% 
Retained Counsel 3 02.86% 
Total (all counsel) 32 04.17% 
Table 33: Offense Severity: Misdemeanor Appeals (Direct Appeals) 
Type of  
Counsel
Number of 
misdemeanor
appeals
Percentage of misdemeanor 
appeals handled by each type 
Appellate Defenders 121 25.69% 
Court-Appointed Attorneys 76 39.58% 
Retained Counsel 58 55.24% 
Total  (all counsel types) 255 33.20% 
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